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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A number of doctrinal concerns have been expressed regarding user 
contracts.  To what extent do the terms of these licences depart from copyright 
law?  Are the rights they grant to the owner broader or more restrictive?  Are 
the entitlements of users, beneficiaries of copyright limits, hindered in some 
form? While no comprehensive empirical study has been conducted to analyse 
the different types of licensing agreements deployed on the market and their 
impact on copyright limits, a body of theoretical legal literature exists on this 
issue. 
This Article provides an overview of the doctrinal debate on this topic, with 
a particular focus on the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland, 
and Portugal.  The latter three countries are interesting for our discourse 
because they have enacted legislation protecting copyright limits from contracts, 
by declaring contractual clauses that override some copyright limits null and 
void.  This literature review is not only concerned with copyright exceptions to 
the exclusive rights of the author, but all of copyright‘s limits, namely the idea-
expression dichotomy, the originality requirement, the first-sale (or exhaustion) 
doctrine, the extent of the economic rights, and the copyright term. 
The review of user contracts is organised as follows: 
SECTION 1 examines the nature of copyright limits and their potential 
impact on the possibility of being contracted out in current licensing practices.  
It subsequently describes the legislation of the countries examined in this 
literature review2 that define copyright limits and exceptions, especially the 
provisions restricting freedom of contract.  It also reviews any relevant case law.  
SECTION 2 discusses the terms of the debate.  The copyright literature is 
divided among (a) those who believe that contracts override users‘ ―rights,‖ and 
therefore legislators should render imperative some or all copyright limits, (b) 
those who believe that contracts are more efficient than copyright law, and 
therefore we should entrust digital copyright matters to ―private ordering,‖ and 
(c) and those who believe the entire question is falsely posed, because contracts 
and copyright belong to different but complementary worlds, that act in useful 
synergy.  This section examines all these arguments. 
SECTION 3 reviews the types of contracts currently utilised by right holders 
to licence copyright material to users.  The analysis is divided by segments of 
users: (a) consumers (natural persons); (b) libraries and universities; (c) 
commercial users (broadcasting institutions, leisure-related businesses, 
audio/video producers, etc.).  This section focuses on the enforceability of 
                                                                                                                   
 2 The U.K., the U.S., Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and Ireland; EU legislation is considered as 
well. 
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electronic standard form contracts (shrink-wrap, click-wrap, browse-wrap), as 
opposed to arms-length agreements, and on their current and potential impact 
on users‘ privileges. 
SECTION 4 examines the limits to freedom of contract residing within 
copyright law (preemption, misuse), contract law, consumer protection 
legislation, competition law, and constitutional principles.  Current and 
prospective limits to contracts embedded within copyright law are also 
discussed in this section.  The focus of the analysis is on the law of the 
countries examined in this literature review and on the international legislation 
impacting them, from the point of view of the legal copyright literature.  
SECTION 5 deals with Digital Rights Management (DRM) and its interplay 
with contracts.  It inquires into the interaction between technological protection 
measures (TPMs) and end-user licence agreements.  It examines the doctrinal 
concerns for and against a right of access of the owner, or of the user.  It also 
briefly reviews the remedies provided to users against DRM which override 
copyright limits.  It concludes with a comparison between contracts and TPMs.3 
SECTION 6 identifies gaps in copyright research, either doctrinal or 
empirical, that may have policy implications in the regulation of the relationship 
of copyright (including related rights) and contract law.  
II.  THE LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  THE EFFECT OF COPYRIGHT LIMITS ON CONTRACTING OUT OF COPYRIGHT 
IS LIMITED IN MANY WAYS:  AT ITS OUTSET, BY THE EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN 
WORKS FROM PROTECTION (IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND 
ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT); DURING ITS EXPLOITATION, BY ECONOMIC 
LIMITS (LIMITED DURATION AND EXHAUSTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT) 
AND BY EXCEPTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
The requirements for protection are based on the idea-expression 
dichotomy and on the principle of originality.  That is, copyright protects the 
expression of the ideas, not the ideas themselves and only a sufficiently original 
creation is protected.  Copyright is also protected for a limited term.  The 
copyright duration is at the basis of the general ―contract‖ between the author 
and the public, according to which authors accept a limited control on their 
work in exchange for exclusive rights that would grant them a fair reward for 
their ―sweat of the brow.‖4 
Further, once copyrighted products embodied in a physical object are 
introduced in the market in a given territory, the right holder loses control of 
                                                                                                                   
 3 TPMs and DRM will be defined in section 4.5. 
 4 L. RAY PATTERSON & STAHLER W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF 
USERS‘ RIGHTS 236 (1991). 
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them—they can be freely resold, lent, or given away by the purchaser.5  This is 
the principle of exhaustion or first-sale.  The rationales behind the principle of 
exhaustion are the preservation of the free movement of goods6 and the 
presence of market failures.7  Finally, copyright exceptions are special 
allowances made to benefit particular categories of users such as libraries, 
teachers, students, researchers, and people with disabilities.  All the above 
exclusions from copyright protection, taken as the general boundaries of 
copyright, are traditionally underpinned by freedom of expression and access to 
information or culture.8 
The debate on the nature of copyright limits is extensive. While some 
copyright exceptions (e.g., like those for the purposes of parody, criticism, and 
news reporting) and copyright exclusions (e.g., like the idea-expression 
dichotomy) are obviously based on fundamental rights like freedom of 
expression, other economic limits (e.g., the first-sale principle) and some 
exceptions (e.g., private copying) are based on market failures.  
The distinction among the underpinnings of copyright limits is, however, 
not always easy to see.  Even copyright limits that are based on some market 
failures can have implications on fundamental public interests.  For example, 
the first-sale doctrine is based on the impossibility of controlling the subsequent 
uses of a purchased copyright work, but it also allows greater access to the work 
by the public, thus enhancing the circulation of culture.  Moreover, some 
copyright literature considers the exception for private copy as supported by the 
fundamental right to privacy.9 
The answer on the nature of copyright exceptions cannot, therefore, be 
uniform.  Some European commentators defined copyright limits not as rights, 
but either as interests, or liberties, or as a ―claim to the application of a rule of 
                                                                                                                   
 5 LUCIE GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS - AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 16 (2002).  
 6 ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
185 (2008).  
 7 See Professor Peter Jaszi‘s testimony before the U.S. Government on the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/jaszi.pdf.  
The first sale doctrine is based on market failure in the United States but in the EU it is also 
based on the principle of  the free movement of  goods and services. 
 8 This is classic copyright doctrine, underscored by some case law (Associated Newspapers v. 
News Group Newspapers, [1986] R.P.C. 515 (EWHC (Ch)); Hyde Park v. Yelland [2001] Ch. 143.  
See ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 20–
21 (2005) (though Burrell and Coleman state that this construct is currently discredited, id. at 21).  
 9 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of  Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 
1103–08; see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, University of  Amsterdam Institute for Information Law, 
Fierce Creatures — Copyright Exceptions: Towards Extinction? Keynote Address at the 
IFLA/IMPRIMATUR Conference (Oct. 30–31, 1997) (transcript available at http://www.ivir.nl/ 
staff/hugenholtz.html).  
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objective right.‖10  Others claim they are ―rights‖ of the user, and there should 
be a clear definition and protection for them in copyright law.11  Similarly, in 
American doctrine, the entitlements of the user have been sometimes qualified 
as ―rights,‖12 and sometimes as a mere remedy against market failures.13 
How does the rationale behind exceptions impact their status?  For many 
authors, the first group of exceptions (i.e., parody, citation, private copying, 
criticism, news reporting), which safeguards fundamental freedoms, has a public 
policy character.14  In other words, such exceptions cannot be limited unless we 
question the principles from which they derive, and this is not possible in a 
democratic society.  Consequently, a user cannot be forced by contract to 
relinquish her freedom of speech or her privacy, as contracts cannot override 
public policy norms.15 
Similarly, commentators believe that private agreements cannot supplant the 
exceptions that are based on the general interest.16  However, since copyright is 
also an instrument in the service of the general interest, a balance should be 
struck between the interests of the users and those of the authors, for instance, 
by way of an equitable remuneration to the authors. Furthermore, as these 
exceptions affect less fundamental principles of society, they should be 
imperative rules rather than public policy norms.17   
The rationale underlying the exceptions based on the regulation of industry 
practices or on the facilitation of trade, conversely, is less strong.  Exceptions 
based on regulatory practices could, therefore, be overridable.  On the other 
hand, the decompilation exception, which regulates competition, has already 
                                                                                                                   
 10 SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D‘AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES ŒUVRES DANS L‘UNIVERS 
NUMERIQUE 486 (2005).  
 11 F.W. Grosheide, Copyright Law from a User‘s Perspective: Access Rights for Users, 23 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 321, 323–25 (2001).  
 12 Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 35–40 (1994).  
 13 Hugenholtz, supra note 9 (merging 1993 and 2004, Bell 1998, Gordon 1982, but see Gordon 
2003 for an adjustment of  this argument).  
 14 Mireille Buydens & Séverine Dusollier, Les exceptions au droit d‘auteur dans l‘environnement 
numérique : évolutions dangereuses, COMMUNICATION – COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE, Sept. 2001, at 13–
14. 
 15 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment: What Eldred Misses — And 
Portends, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 129, 143 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds., 
2005). 
 16 Buydens & Dusollier, supra note 14, at 14; Thomas Vinje, Copyright Imperilled, 21 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 192, 193 (1999); Dusollier, supra note 10, at 508–09 (arguing that exceptions 
for public lending, handicapped people, teaching, libraries and archives should be imperative as 
well as the exception for normal use). 
 17 Buydens & Dusollier, supra note 14, at 14. 
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been made mandatory in Europe, on the basis that loyal and free competition is 
in the public interest.18 
The exceptions exclusively founded on market failure, which, therefore, do 
not reflect a fundamental value of society or the general interest, are bound to 
disappear in the digital environment, as authors can now prevent the digital 
copying of works and enforce their copyright.  Examples are the exception for 
ephemeral recordings made by broadcasting organisations,19 for the incidental 
inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in other material,20 and the 
exception for the use in connection with the demonstration or repair of 
equipment.21  In the opinion of some commentators, each Member State should 
be allowed to attribute a default character to these exceptions.22 
In conclusion, the nature of each copyright limit is crucial to determine its 
overridability by contract law.  Following the views of the above literature, we 
can assume that while a clause impeding, for example, any criticism of a work 
would be clearly unenforceable, market failure-driven exceptions can be safely 
contracted out of.  In practice, this is currently decided on a case-by-case basis.  
For example, case law in a few EU Member States clearly determined the nature 
of ―defence‖ and not ―right‖ of the entitlement of the user to perform a copy 
for personal use;23 whereas in U.S. courts, fair use seems to be generally 
prevailing on contract clauses.24 
 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Derclaye, supra note 6, at 181. 
 19 Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(2)(d), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC) [hereinafter InfoSoc 
Directive].  Note that this exception is classified differently by L. Guibault, as an exception 
intended to regulate industry practices.  
 20 Id. art. 5(3)(i).  
 21 Id. art. 5(3)(l); Buydens & Dusollier, supra note 14, at 14.  
 22 This means that they would be overridable by contract.  See Buydens and Dusollier, supra 
note 14, at 14; Dusollier, supra note 10, at 508–09.  
 23 Stéphane P, UFC Que Choisir v. Universal Pictures Video France - Tribunale de grande 
instance [T.G.I.] [court of  first instance] Paris, 3ème chambre, 2ème section, Jugement du 30 avril 
2004 ; Cour d‘Appel de Paris, 4ème chambre, section B, Arrêt du 22 avril 2005 ; Cour de 
Cassation — Première chambre civile Arrêt du 28 février 2006 .  L‘ASBL Association Belge des 
Consommateurs TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded Music Belgium, Tribunal de premiére instance 
de Bruxelles, [Civ] [court of  first instance], Jugement du May 25 2004, No 2004/46/A du rôle des 
référés.  
 24 DSC Comm. Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).  However, this must be taken with a pinch of  salt, as other 
decisions, such as ProCD (see below), have enforced contracts which overturn copyright limits.  
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B.  COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LIMITS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
All copyright regimes analysed in this study share the same limits to 
copyright protection: the idea-expression dichotomy; the originality 
requirement; a limited term of protection; the exhaustion or first-sale doctrine; 
and a limited number of economic rights.  However, each of the countries 
studied in this literature review adopts a different approach on copyright 
exceptions and the way they can be varied by contract.  This part examines the 
statutes of these countries on the specific matter of copyright limits, and 
investigates whether the law provides some protection against private 
agreements containing clauses that override or modify them. 
III.  THE UNITED STATES 
The idea-expression dichotomy in the U.S. is stipulated by § 102(b) of Title 
17 of the United States Code (USC), which states that ―[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery. . . .‖  Further, some originality of the work is also required for 
copyright protection in the U.S., but the requirement is not very strict, as set by 
Feist v. Rural Telephone in 1991.25  Moreover, the term of copyright has been 
extended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (Sonny 
Bono Act) (from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author 
plus seventy years).26  Finally, the first-sale doctrine applies to digital works 
stored on physical media,27 but it does not apply to works downloadable from 
the Internet, which are considered services rather than goods.28 
Copyright exceptions, on the other hand, are protected under the fair-use 
doctrine codified at § 107, which reads:29 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  Here, it was stated: ‗only 
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), 
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of  creativity . . . even a slight amount will 
suffice.‖  
 26 Copyright Term Extensions Act [CTEA], Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of  17 U.S.C.). 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2010).  
 28 The exclusion of  internet goods from the first-sale doctrine is discussed within the 
copyright doctrine.  Some believe that technology could help in rendering digital internet works 
similar to those stored on physical carriers, and therefore subject to the first-sale rule.  Victor F. 
Calaba, Quibbles ‗N Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1 (2002).  Others believe that digital works that can be permanently stored in a computer 
hard drive have features more similar to products than to services.  GIUSEPPE MAZZIOTTI, EU 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE END-USER 67 (2008). 
 29 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the 
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include— 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
Fair use, therefore, is an open-ended exception that allows a court to excuse 
acts that would normally amount to infringement, both in the cases defined in 
§ 107 and in other similar cases.  The United States Code contains also a 
specific list of exceptions in §§ 108–122.  They can be divided into the 
following categories: limitations to support freedom of information;30 
limitations for a specific social action or purpose;31 limitations for private use;32 
limitations concerning activities that are necessary accessories to other 
permitted actions and are economically reasonable;33 and compulsory licenses, 
which may be justified by transaction costs of negotiating licenses, by the 
importance of certain industry sectors, or by other factors.34  Fair use is a 
mobile concept, always in evolution.  For example, during the history of fair-
use, case law adapted this exemption to the peculiar characteristics of the 
technology.  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,35 the Supreme 
Court held that private videotaping of free TV broadcasting did not amount to 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Section 108 allows qualified libraries and archives to make and distribute noncommercial 
copies for preservation or research purposes, under specific conditions.  Sections 110(1) and (2) 
allow performance and display of  copyrighted works, through transmissions or otherwise, in 
connection with nonprofit teaching activities, under specific conditions. 
 31 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(3), (4), (8), (9), 118, 120(a), 121 (2010). 
 32 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), (c), 1008.  
 33 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(7), 112, 113(c), (d), 117, 120(b), 512. 
 34 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of  17 U.S.C.). 
 35 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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copyright infringement.  Likewise, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,36 the court held 
that making thumbnails out of photographs for use on a search page was fair 
use.  
The exceptions for libraries in the U.S. also have been ―updated‖ to meet 
the needs of the digital environment.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 199837 modified the limitations for libraries, permitting the latter up 
to three copies for preservation and replacement purposes.  The Sonny Bono 
Act also expanded library exceptions by giving libraries a limited right to use the 
works in the last twenty years of their copyright term for purposes of 
preservation, scholarship, or research, if the works are not subject to normal 
commercial exploitation or are not available at a reasonable price.38 
With regard to the relationship between copyright limits and contracts, we 
need to state at the outset that freedom of contract in the U.S. is paramount.  
Article 1 Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution forbids the States to pass 
legislation impairing the obligation of contract without the consent of the 
Congress.39  Moreover, case law has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as 
protecting the freedom of contract.40  Therefore, a legally enforceable contract 
is likely to be able to override copyright limits.  The U.S. Copyright Act does 
not contain a provision making copyright limits imperative, i.e., not overridable 
by contract. 
IV.  THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In the European Union, most of the limits to copyright are set by the 
Directive on Copyright and related rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc 
Directive),41 the Directive for the legal protection of computer programmes 
(Software Directive),42 and the Directive for the legal protection of databases 
(Database Directive).43  In the latter two is also found the originality 
requirement, which states that a work has to be the author‘s own intellectual 
                                                                                                                   
 36 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 37 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1205, 1301, 1332 (2006). 
 38 CTA § 104. 
 39 Guibault, supra note 5, at 116. 
 40 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1879).  But see Glynn v. Mrargetson & Co., [1893] 
A.C. 351 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.); London & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Neilson, [1922] 2 A.C. 
263 (H.L.) (appeal taken from K.B.) (U.K.); Canada Steamship Co. v. The King, [1952] A.C. 192 
(J.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.) Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler Cycle Co., [1959] A.C. 
576 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing) (limiting the freedom of  contract within the terms of  
reasonable clauses). 
 41 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, at 10–19. 
 42 Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42-46 (EC) [hereinafter Software Directive]. 
 43 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20-28 (EC) [hereinafter Database Directive]. 
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creation.44  The copyright duration has also been harmonised by the Copyright 
Term Directive of 1993, modified by the Term Directive of 2006.45  The latter 
is now in the process of being modified; the proposal mainly purports to extend 
the protection of sound recordings from fifty to ninety-five years.46  
The principle of exhaustion (corresponding to the American first-sale 
doctrine) has been made uniform in the EU law by Article 4.2 of the InfoSoc 
Directive, which limits the distribution right.47  This limit, as observed in the 
U.S., does not apply to copyrighted works distributed on demand.48 
The Software and Database Directives stipulate imperative exceptions to 
copyright, not overridable by contracts.  Article 9(1) of the Software Directive 
of 1992 expressly provides that ―any contractual provision contrary to Article 6 
or to the exceptions provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) shall be null and 
void.‖49  These articles protect, respectively, decompilation,50 lawful use,51 
observation, study, and testing of computer programs.52 
Article 15 of the Database Directive states that ―any contractual provision 
contrary to Articles 6(1) and 8 shall be null and void.‖  The referred Article 6(1) 
stipulates that 
the performance by the lawful user of a database or of a copy 
thereof of any of the acts listed in Article 5 which is necessary for 
the purposes of access to the contents of the databases and 
normal use of the contents by the lawful user shall not require the 
authorisation of the author of the database.53 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Software Directive, supra note 42, art. 1.3; Database Directive, supra note 43, Recital 16. 
 45 Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9-13 (EC) of  29 October 1993 harmonizing the 
term of  protection of  copyright and certain related rights; Official Journal L 290, 24/11/1993 P. 
0009 – 0013.  According to Article 1(1) of  the Term Directive 1993 copyright is protected for 70 
years from the death of  the author.  Council Directive 2006/116, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12–18 (EC) 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on the term of  protection 
of  copyright and certain related rights Official Journal L 372 , 27/12/2006 P. 0012 – 0018. 
 46 Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive, amending Directive 
2006/116, at 6, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2008) 464 final (July 26, 2008). 
 47 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, art. 4(2) (―The distribution right shall not be exhausted 
within the Community in respect of  the original or copies of  the work, except where the first sale 
or other transfer of  ownership in the Community of  that object is made by the rightholder or 
with his consent.‖). 
 48 For the debate on this issue, see Calaba, supra note 28, and Mazziotti, supra note 28, at 67. 
 49 Database Directive, supra note 43, art. 15. 
 50 Software Directive, supra note 42, art. 6. 
 51 Id. art. 5(1). 
 52 Id. art. 5(3). 
 53 Id. art. 6(1). 
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Finally, Article 8 allows a lawful user of a database to extract and/or to re-
utilise for any purposes whatsoever insubstantial parts of the contents of a 
database protected under the sui generis right. 
The above suggests that, in the domain of software and databases, copyright 
exceptions are protected against contracts. However, the copyright literature has 
raised some concerns. Problems, for example, have been identified for the 
practical applications of the provisions of the Database Directive.54 Moreover, 
uncertainty has been voiced on the ability of the Software Directive to establish 
the statutory nature of its exceptions, whose modes of exercise can be defined 
by contract.55  Further, dissatisfaction has been expressed because the above 
provisions leave uncovered optional copyright exceptions, copyright exclusions 
(e.g., works not protected by copyright, idea-expression dichotomy), and 
copyright economic limits (duration and first-sale).56  Finally, the EU Member 
States implemented the above provisions in different ways, creating different 
levels of protection within the EU. 57 
However, the most discussed piece of legislation in EU copyright law was 
the InfoSoc Directive, which is mandated to settle owners‘ and users‘ 
entitlements relating to copyright in the digital environment.  In its Article 5, 
the InfoSoc Directive lists a number of copyright exceptions to the 
reproduction right and to the communication right of the owner.58  Of these 
exceptions, only the first (caching copying for technical reasons)59 is mandatory 
for Member States.  They can choose whether to implement any of the other 
exceptions.60  Article 5 has been extensively criticised by the literature.  The 
main criticisms concern both the optional nature of the list and its misguided 
ambition of being exhaustive.61 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Estelle Derclaye, Copyright Contracts, Public Policy, and Competition: Can Adhesion Contracts 
Override Copyright Limits? The Answer Lies within Copyright Law Itself, in COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY IN ASIA, IIC STUDIES 167, 184 (Christopher Heath & Kung-Chung Liu 
eds., 2007). 
 55 SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D‘AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L‘UNIVERS 
NUMÉRIQUE – DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS À LA LUMIÉRE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES 
œUVRES 498 (2d ed. 2007). 
 56 See Derclaye, supra note 6, at 176; Lucie Guibault, Wrapping Information in Contract: How Does it 
Affect the Public Domain?, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN 
INFORMATION LAW 87, 94–97 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 57 Guibault, supra note 5, at 219; Guibault, supra note 56, at 97. 
 58 Infosoc Directive, supra note 19, art. 5. 
 59 Id. art. 5(1). 
 60 P. Bernt Huzenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, 22 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 499, 501–02 (2000) (defining the exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive as a 
―shopping list‖). 
 61 Thomas Heide, The Approach To Innovation Under The Proposed Copyright Directive: Time For 
Mandatory Exceptions, 3 INTELL. PROP. QUARTERLY 215, 215–23 (2000); Michael Hart, The Proposed 
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Most of the copyright exceptions, therefore, according to the InfoSoc 
Directive, are optional.  However, in Article 6(4) the InfoSoc Directive lists 
seven mandatory exceptions that have to be respected by technological 
protection measures.62  According to some, this suggests that at least these 
exceptions should be considered mandatory against licensing agreements, a 
fortiori.63  According to the letter of the Directive, this is all but certain.  In fact, 
the opposite appears to be true, and this is indicated by a number of factors. 
First, the InfoSoc Directive is posterior to the Software and Database 
Directives, and the latter two directives contain express provisions on the 
mandatory nature of the exceptions to the rights they grant.  Therefore, if the 
EU legislators also wanted to stipulate imperative copyright exceptions in the 
InfoSoc Directive, they probably would have done so.64 
Second, the above is confirmed by the second reading of the Proposal for 
the Directive, in which amendment 156 proposed the introduction of a new 
Article 5(6) stating that ―[n]o contractual measures may conflict with the 
exceptions or limitations incorporated into national law pursuant to Article 5.‖65  
This amendment was not accepted by the Commission, and this clearly 
indicates its position on the matter.66  
                                                                                                                   
Directive for Copyright in the Information Society: Nice Rights, Shame about the Exceptions, 20 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 169, 171 (1998); CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS, 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION: NOT MORE BUT DIFFERENT, available at http://www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/ 
cpbreeksen/werkdoc/122/cr/; Hugenholtz, supra note 9; Séverine Dusollier, Tipping the Scale in 
Favour of the Right Holders: The European Anti-Circumvention Provisions, in DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 462, 473 
(Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003); Lucie Guibault, The Nature and Scope of Limitations and 
Exceptions to Copyright and Neighbouring Rights with Regard to General Interest Missions for the Transmission 
of Knowledge: Prospects for their Adaptation to the Digital Environment, E-COPYRIGHT BULLETIN, 
October–December 20003, at 39, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001396/ 
139671e.pdf. 
 62 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, art. 6(4). 
 63 Hugenholtz, supra note 60. 
 64 See Thomas Heide, Copyright, Contract and the Legal Protection of  Technological Measures – Not ―the 
Old Fashioned Way‖: Providing a Rationale to the ―Copyright Exceptions Interface,‖ 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y 
U.S.A. 315 (2003) (arguing that the Software Directive should have served as a model to the 
InfoSoc Directive, because its ―copyright exceptions interface‖ is the most efficient). 
 65 INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN 
MEMBER STATES‘ LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN 
ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (2007), 
http://www.ivir.hl/publications/guibault/Infosoc_report_2007.pdf, citing European Parliament, 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.euro 
parl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=_//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0043+0+ 
DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 
 66 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, 17 January 2001, 
PE 298.368/5-197, cited in GUIBAULT ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM INSTITUTE FOR 
INFORMATION LAW, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER STATES‘ LAWS OF 
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Third, not only is there no express protection of copyright limits from 
private contracting, but there are also specific allowances for rights or privileges 
that can be contracted away.67  Recital 45 states that ―[t]he exceptions and 
limitations referred to in Article 5(2), (3) and (4) should not, however, prevent 
the definition of contractual relations designed to ensure fair compensation for 
the rightholders insofar as permitted by national law.‖68  Further, Article 6(4) 
excludes from the application of copyright exceptions on-demand services 
―available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members 
of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them.‖69 
Recital 45 has been interpreted differently by subsequent doctrine.70  Some 
believe the Recital clearly states that the exceptions in Article 5(2) to 5(4) can be 
overridden by contracts.71  Others argue that the meaning of this Recital is that 
―the ability to perform legitimate uses that do not require the authorisation of 
rights holders is a factor that can be considered in the context of contractual 
agreements about the price.‖72  This interpretation suggests that the leeway of 
rights holders does not concern contracts, but the determination of the price, 
with reference to those exceptions that are compensated for by compulsory 
licensing.73  
However, no doubt exists on the interpretation of the relevant part of 
Article 6(4), which clearly excludes works made available online from the 
application of the exceptions listed in Article 6, and leaves the matter to private 
ordering.74  This provision has been criticised by legal scholars for setting a two-
tier protection for copyright exceptions, and a reform of Article 6(4) has been 
proposed.75 
                                                                                                                   
DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (2007), available at http://www.ivir.nl/ 
publications/guibault/Infosoc_report_2007.pdf [hereinafter IViR]. 
 67 Id. at 157. 
 68 Id. at 137. 
 69 Id. at 138. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Stefan BECHTOLD, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 
323, 366 (2004), citing Hugenholtz, supra note 60, at 501; Dusollier, supra note 55, at 502; Heide, 
supra note 64, at 327. 
 72  IViR, supra note 66, at Part I, 137. 
 73 Id. at 153, citing Séverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property through Private Ordering, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391 (2007). 
 74 Id. at 153, citing Séverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private Ordering, 
82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1391 (2007). 
 75 Dusollier, supra note 55, at 502; PATRÍCIA AKESTER, TECHNOLOGICAL ACCOMMODATION OF 
CONFLICT BETWEEN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DRM: THE FIRST EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 122 
(2009), http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/download/technological-accommodation-of-
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Finally, not all legal commentators are convinced that the above provisions 
stipulate the contractual overridability of copyright exceptions.  Some reckon 
that the question is left to national legislators.76  Moreover, others argue that the 
interpretation of the existing national and European copyright law may provide 
a sufficient shelter, especially for copyright limits based on fundamental rights 
or liberties, or the public interest.77  However, the part of the examined 
literature that calls for a clear formulation of the imperative and non-
overridable nature (by contract or TPMs) of a number of copyright exceptions 
seems to prevail (see Section B). 
No EU case law helps to clarify whether copyright exceptions prevail over 
contract, or vice versa.  A few rulings in some EU Member States have 
examined the question of the exception for private copying, declaring that it is 
not a ―right.‖78 These judgements, moreover, focused on the duty of the rights 
holder to disclose the existence and functioning of a technological protection 
measure, considered as an essential feature of the product.  They were 
concerned, therefore, with the instruments of consumer protection.  The terms 
of the licence (probably forbidding the reproduction) were not examined.  In 
conclusion, the EU case law so far leaves open the question of the contractual 
overridability of copyright limits (except those clearly made imperative in the 
Software and Database Directives).79  
                                                                                                                   
conflicts-between-freedom-of-expression-and-drm-the-first-empirical-assessment/6286/pdf.  For a 
more cautious position on this matter see also Burrel & Coleman, supra note 8, at 309. 
 76 Dusollier, supra note 55, at 503. 
 77 P. Bernt Hugenholtz, University of  Amsterdam Institute for Information Law, The Future 
of  Copyright Limitations, Address at the Third UNESCO Congress on Ethical, Legal and 
Societal Challenges of  Cyberspace (Nov. 13–15, 2000); Derclaye, supra note 54, at 186–211.  
 78 Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, L'ASBL Association Belge des Consommateurs 
TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded Music Belgium, Sony Music Entertainment (Belgium), SA 
Universal Music, SA Bertelsmann Music Group Belgium, SA IFPI Belgium, Jugement du 25 mai 
2004, No 2004/46/A du rôle des référes.  For France, see François M. v. EMI France, Auchan 
France – Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre [court of  first instance], 6ème chambre, 
Jugement du 2 septembre 2003; Cour d'Appel De Versailles, 1re Chambre, 1re section, 30 
septembre 2004; Stéphane P, UFC Que Choisir v. Universal Pictures Video France et Autres – 
Tribunale de Grande Instance de Paris [court of  first instance], 3ème chambre, 2ème section, 
Jugement du 30 avril 2004; Cour d‘Appel de Paris, 4ème chambre, section B, Arrêt du 22 avril 
2005; Cour de Cassation – Première chambre civile Arrêt du 28 février 2006; and Christophe R., 
UFC Que Choisir v. Warner Music France, Fnac – Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [court of  
first instance] 5ème chambre, 1ère section Jugement du 10 janvier 2006.  For Germany, see 
BVerfG: ‗Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen urheberrechtliche Kopierschutz-Regelungen‘(Beschl. v. 
25.07.2005 - Az: 1 BvR 2182/04).  See also André Lucas, L‘apposition d‘une mesure technique de 
protection sur un DVD est légitime au regard de l‘exception de copie privée, 21 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 
EDITION GENERALE 1065 (2006) (Fr.). 
 79 Although there is no case law, it seems pretty clear that courts would respect the provisions 
of  the directives providing for imperativity. 
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A.  THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 200380 came into force on 
October 31, 2003 and modified the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198881 
to bring it into line with the InfoSoc Directive.  Other legislation impacting on 
the protection of copyright are:  
- The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992;82 
- The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performance 
Regulations 1995;83 
- The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996;84 
- The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997;85 
- The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003;86 
- The Copyright (EC Measures Relating to Pirated Goods and 
Abolition of Restrictions on the Import of Goods) Regulations 
1995.87 
The idea-expression dichotomy in the U.K. is not defined by statutory law.  
However, as Lord Hoffmann stated in Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams 
Textiles Ltd.,88 it is defined in TRIPS,89 of which the U.K. is a signatory.  Article 
9.2 states that ―copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to 
ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.‖90 
The requirement of originality, on the other hand, was recently redefined in 
Hyperion Records Ltd. v. Sawkins,91 where it was stated: ―In the end the question is 
one of degree—how much skill, labour and judgement in the making of the 
copy is that of the creator of that copy? Both individual creative input and 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498 (U.K.). 
 81 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act [CDPA], 1988, c. 48 (Eng.). 
 82 The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations, 1992, S.I. 1992/3233 (U.K.). 
 83 The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performance Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/3297 
(U.K.). 
 84 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 1996, S.I. 1996/2967 (U.K.). 
 85 The Copyright and Rights in Database Regulations, 1997, S.I. 1997/3032 (U.K.). 
 86 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498 (U.K.). 
 87 The Copyright (EC Measures Relating to Pirated Goods and Abolition of Restrictions on 
the Import of Goods) Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/1445 (U.K.). 
 88 [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416 (H.L.) at 2422. 
 89 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: 
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 90 Id. § 1, art. 9(2). 
 91 [2005] EWCA (Civ) 565.  
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sweat of brow may be involved and will be factors in the overall evaluation.‖92  
The level of originality in the U.K. and Ireland is arguably now governed by the 
Infopaq case,93 which requires intellectual creation and is thus higher than skill, 
judgement, and labour.  No decision from the U.K. or Irish courts has been 
handed down to confirm this as the Infopaq case is still very recent. 
 The above case law shows that the criteria of the idea-expression 
dichotomy and originality are intertwined, and it is a very delicate matter to 
identify a subject of protection on the basis of these requirements.94 
With regard to other copyright limits, the U.K. has a list of statutory 
exceptions defined in SS 28a-76, CDPA.  These exceptions are for: 
● making of temporary copies 
● fair dealing for research and private study 
● fair dealing for criticism, review and news reporting 
● incidental inclusion of copyright material 
● visual impairment defences 
● education defences 
● libraries and archives defences 
● public administration (including parliamentary and judicial 
proceedings) 
● computer programs: lawful users (including back up copies and 
decompilation) 
● databases 
● designs and typefaces 
● works in electronic form 
● anonymous or pseudonymous works: acts permitted on 
assumptions as to expiry of copyright or death of author 
● use of notes or recordings of spoken words in certain cases 
● public reading or recitation 
● abstracts of scientific or technical articles 
● recordings of folksongs 
● representation of certain artistic works on public display 
● advertisement of sale of artistic work 
● making of subsequent works by same artist 
● reconstruction of buildings 
● lending to public of copies of certain works 
● films: acts permitted on assumptions as to expiry of copyright 
                                                                                                                   
 92 Id. at 83. 
 93 Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int‘l A/D v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 1493 (July 116, 2009).  
 94 See also Burrel & Coleman, supra note 8, at 22. 
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● recording for purposes of time-shifting 
● photographs of broadcasts 
● free public showing or playing of broadcast for certain 
purposes 
● recording for archival purposes95 
 
The CDPA‘s Schedule 5A sets out the permitted acts to which section 
296ZE applies:96 
● section 29 (research and private study) 
● section 31A (making a single accessible copy for personal use) 
● section 31B (multiple copies for visually impaired persons) 
● section 31C (intermediate copies and records) 
● section 32(1), (2) and (3) (things done for purposes of 
instruction or examination) 
● section 35 (recording by educational establishments of 
broadcasts) 
● section 36 (reprographic copying by educational establishments 
of passages from published works) 
● section 38 (copying by librarians: articles in periodicals) 
● section 39 (copying by librarians: parts of published works) 
● section 41 (copying by librarians: supply of copies to other 
libraries) 
● section 42 (copying by librarians or archivists: replacement 
copies of works) 
● section 43 (copying by librarians or archivists: certain 
unpublished works) 
● section 44 (copy of work required to be made as condition of 
export) 
● section 45 (Parliamentary and judicial proceedings) 
● section 46 (Royal Commissions and statutory inquiries) 
● section 47 (material open to public inspection or on official 
register) 
● section 48 (material communicated to the Crown in the course 
of public business) 
● section 49 (public records) 
                                                                                                                   
 95 CDPA, supra note 81. 
 96 Id. § 296ZE (providing a mechanism in the event users are not able to benefit from an 
exception because of a TPM). 
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● section 50 (acts done under statutory authority) 
● section 61 (recordings of folksongs) 
● section 68 (incidental recording for purposes of broadcast) 
● section 69 (recording for purposes of supervision and control 
of broadcasts) 
● section 70  (recording for purposes of time-shifting) 
● section 71 (photographs of broadcasts) 
● section 74 (provision of sub-titled copies of broadcast) 
● section 75 (recording for archival purposes)97 
 
The implementation of the InfoSoc Directive 2001 has slightly modified the 
above list of exceptions.  For example, the exception to make temporary copies 
has been introduced according to Article 5(1) of the Directive.98  Other existing 
exceptions have been curtailed.  For example, the exception for research and 
private study, which now needs to be carried out only for non-commercial 
purposes and with acknowledgement of the source, in order to be exempted 
from infringement. 
Moreover, section 29 of the CDPA stipulates the exceptions for fair dealing 
for the purposes of research and private study, while section 30 defines fair 
dealing for the purposes of criticism, review, and news reporting.99  The 
definition of fair dealing, operated by the above statute and by some case law,100 
makes it rather more restrictive than American fair use, to the extent that some 
commentators raise concerns about its consistency with free speech issues.101 
Nothing in the Copyright Act forbids contracting out of the above 
exceptions.  A notable exception is section 36(4) CDPA which makes section 
36 imperative.  Section 36(4) states: 
the terms of a licence granted to an educational establishment 
authorising the reprographic copying for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Id. 
 98 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, at 5(1). 
 99 CDPA, supra note 81, §§ 29–30. 
 100 See Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd., [1973] 1 All E.R. 262 (Ch.); ProSieben Media AG v. Carlton 
U.K. Television Ltd., [1999] 1 W.L.R. 605, 611 (A.C.).  See also Hubbard v. Vosper, (1972) 2 Q.B. 
84, 94–95 (discussing the exclusion of unpublished works from fair dealing); ProSieben, [1999] 1 
W.L.R. at 626 (discussing the use for an approved purpose, necessary for the fair dealing 
exemption).  For the issue of criticism and review see Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2001] 
Ch. 685, aff‘d, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142, [2002] Ch. 149; Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, 
[1999] R.P.C. 665, 661, rev‘d, [2001] Ch. 143; Time Warner Entm‘ts Co. v. Channel Four 
Television Corp., [1994] E.M.L.R. 1 (Civ.). 
 101 Burrel & Coleman, supra note 8, at 45. 
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instruction of passages from published works are of no effect so 
far as they purport to restrict the proportion of a work which 
may be copied (whether on payment or free of charge) to less 
than that which would be permitted under this section.102 
As to the other exceptions, existing legal doctrines outside copyright statutes 
may impact on contracts, varying them.  For example, commentators argue that 
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, and the common law 
defence of ―public interest,‖ now codified under section 171(3) have to be 
taken into account.103 
Finally, in U.K. law, the Software Directive and the Database Directive have 
been implemented, and therefore it is not possible to override by contract the 
lawful access to and use of a database, including everything that is necessary for 
it:104 the carrying out of a back-up copy;105 the right to decompile a computer 
program;106 or the observation, study, and testing of it.107  Moreover, fair 
dealing to report current events cannot be contracted out of with reference to 
the inclusion of a broadcast in another broadcast.108  
B.  BELGIUM109 
Copyright in Belgium is regulated by the Law of the 30th of June 1994 on 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (the Copyright Act),110 which has been 
modified by the Law of the 31st of August 1998, implementing the Database 
Directive,111 and by the Law of the 22nd of May 2005 implementing the 
InfoSoc Directive.112 
                                                                                                                   
 102 CDPA, supra note 81, § 36(4). 
 103 Id. at 80–112. 
 104 CDPA, supra note 81, § 50D. 
 105 Id. § 50A. 
 106 Id. § 50B. 
 107 Id. § 50BA. 
 108 Broadcasting Act 1996, c.55 § 137 (Eng.). 
 109 General notions on the Belgian legislation have been drawn by the National Report 
presented at the ALAI conference in Barcelona 2006 (published by ALAI, ALADDA 2008 - 
hereinafter ALAI 2008).  The report was drafted by Carine Doutrelepont, François Dubuisson, 
Joris Deene, and Katrien Van der Perre. Regarding the lists of copyright exceptions, free 
translations and summaries are provided by the author of the present work. 
 110 M.B., July 27, 1994, 19297; err. M.B., Nov. 5, 1994, 27467 et M.B., Nov. 22, 1994, 28832. 
 111 M.B., Nov. 14, 1998. 
 112 Loi du 22 mai 2005 transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 22 mai 2001 sur 
l‘harmonisation de certains aspects du droit d‘auteur et des droits voisins dans la société de 
l‘information, M.B., May 27, 2005, 24997. 
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Software is protected in a separate law, the Law of the 30th of June 1994,113 
and the sui generis right protecting databases is enshrined in the Law of the 31st 
of August 1998, implementing the Database Directive.114  Some consumer 
rights related to copyright might be protected by the consumer Law of the 14th 
of July 1991115 or the competition Law of the 1st of July 1999.116 
Copyright in Belgium is excluded if the work is not original, and the 
requirement of originality has been defined by the case law.117  The Belgian 
Copyright Act makes no mention of the idea-expression dichotomy, but it is 
clearly applicable in Belgium owing to TRIPs and the case law that takes it into 
account.  The Copyright Act stipulates a list of exceptions to the exclusive 
rights of the author in Articles 21–23, which is intended to be exhaustive.  
Further exceptions are enshrined in Article 22bis (for databases) and in Articles 
46–47 (for neighbouring rights).  They are defined by some literature as a 
―partial derogation‖ of exclusive rights.118  According to the current legal 
doctrine, the above exceptions can be divided into: (a) legal exceptions and (b) 
compulsory licences (‗exceptions légales‘ and ‗licences légales‘).119 
Among the compulsory licences are included: private reprography, 
reprography for teaching and research, copying for teaching and research, 
communication for teaching and research, and private copying. 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Loi transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 14 mai 1991 concernant la 
protection juridique des programmes d‘ordinateur, M.B., July 27, 1994, 19315. 
 114 Loi transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 11 mars 1996 concernant la 
protection juridique des bases de données, M.B. Nov. 14, 1998, 36914.  
 115 Loi du 14 juillet 1991 sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l‘information et la protection du 
consommateur, M.B., Aug. 29, 1991. 
 116 Loi du 1er juillet 1999 sur la protection de la concurrence économique (coordonnant la loi 
du 5 août 1991), M.B., Sept. 1, 1999.  See also Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, (2006), Équilibrer 
la liberté d‘expression et le droit d‘auteur. À propos des libertés de créer et d‘user des Œuvres 9, in DROIT 
D‘AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D‘EXPRESSION (Alain Strowel ed., 2006), at 9, arguing that author's right is 
always subject to competition law. 
 117 For the originality requirement, see Cass., 25 October 1989, Bidelot c/ Egret et Stas, Pas., 
1990, I, 238. and Cass., 11 March 2005, Balta Industries S.A. c/ R. Vanden Berghe S.A., 
http://www.juridat.be.  See also Alain Strowel, ‗L‘originalité en droit d‘auteur : un critère à géométrie 
variable, 1991 Journal des Tribunaux 513, 515; for the fixation requirement see Civ. Bruxelles (réf.), 
17 July 2001, Cortina c/ État belge, A. & M., 2002, p. 69 , Palouzie c/ S.A. Épithète Films et 
Faraldo, J.L.M.B., 2001, p. 1444; all cited in the Belgian response to the questionnaire in ALAI 
2008.  On the originality requirement, see also ALAIN STROWEL & ESTELLE DERCLAYE, DROIT 
D‘AUTEUR ET NUMERIQUE: LOGICIELS, BASES DE DONNÉES, MULTIMEDIA 23 (2001).  
 118 Dirk Voorhoof & Katrien Van der Perre, L‘exception au droit d‘auteur – droit belge, in LA 
NUMÉRISATION POUR L‘ENSEIGNEMENT ET LA RECHERCHÉ: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES 265 (I. de 
Lamberterie ed., 2003). 
 119 Alain Strowel & Jean-Paul Triaille, Le droit d‘auteur. Du logiciel au multimédia, 11 CAHIER DU 
CRID 148 (1996). 
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The legal exceptions are for: citation, anthology purposes, temporary 
reproduction, news reporting; reproduction/communication; reproduction in 
family circles, parody, public examinations, archiving, access from a terminal, 
radio broadcasting, disabled people, exhibitions in art galleries, social 
institutions, and public lending. 
A similar list of exceptions is stipulated for neighbouring rights, with the 
addition, in some instances, of the provision for compulsory licences for the 
fair compensation of the right holder.  
In the legal framework envisaged for the protection of databases, the 
Belgian legislature added two new exceptions from the Database Directive: (a) 
the exceptions for acts necessary to a lawful user for the normal utilization of 
the work and (b) the utilization for reasons of public security or within 
administrative or judicial proceedings.  
Moreover, the Belgian copyright legislation provides, with reference to 
databases protected by copyright, many of the exceptions reserved to copyright: 
private photocopying, photocopying for teaching and research, copyright for 
teaching and research, communication for teaching and research, news 
reporting, incidental reproduction/communication, reproduction in family 
circles, parody, public examination; and public lending. 
Finally, in the field of computer software, the Law of the 30th of June 1994 
authorises the making of a back-up copy, the normal utilization of the program, 
the software testing, studying, and reverse engineering.  In this case, however, 
the exceptions provided for copyright in general were not extended to 
computer software.120  In Belgium, all the exceptions to the sui generis right (i.e., 
the equivalent of Art. 8, 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) of the Database Directive) have been 
implemented and are mandatory.121  Accordingly, users cannot be presented 
with either standard-form or fully-negotiated contracts that would restrain the 
scope of the exceptions or that would allow some remuneration for acts that are 
in principle excepted.  
                                                                                                                   
 120 However some literature suggests that the traditional copyright exceptions also apply to 
software.  See Strowel & Derclaye, supra note 117, at 242 nn.280–81; apart from the exceptions for 
study and private copy, which are already regulated by the directive, these authors think that all 
the other exceptions stipulated by the Copyright Act are applicable to software. 
 121 Art. 11 of Law of Aug. 31, 1998, implementing in Belgium the European Directive of Mar. 
11, 1996 relating to the legal protection of databases, M.B. Nov. 14, 1998, in force Nov. 14, 1998 
(Database Act).  Note however that the law implementing the Copyright Directive in Belgium 
(act of May 22, 2005, implementing in Belgian law the European Directive 2001/29/EC relating 
to the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
M.B. May 27, 2005, p. 24997) adds a second paragraph to article 11 of the Database Act, which 
makes an exception to this mandatory nature for databases made available to the public on agreed 
contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at 
a time individually chosen by them. 
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The preparatory texts to the Belgian Database Act explain that the 
mandatory nature has been provided to avoid exceptions being overturned by 
the application of other laws less favourable to users.  Article 11 forbids 
contractual clauses providing for the application of a foreign law.122  
Furthermore, the exceptions to exclusive rights in Belgian copyright law are 
expressly declared imperative and not overridable by contract.  The Law of 31st 
August 1998 implementing the Database Directive provides, in Article 23bis, 
that ―the provisions of articles 21, 22, 22bis et 23(1) and (3), are imperative.‖123  
In other words, no derogation is permitted.  Every contrary clause is considered 
null and void.  
The choice of the Belgian legislature, to declare all exceptions imperative 
without distinguishing between fundamental rights and market failures, appears 
puzzling to some commentators.124  It has been argued that as a result of this 
choice, these provisions introduced a recognition of the ―rights‖ of the user,125 
although admittedly they did not establish a ―right of access‖ of the user.126  
However, the Law of the 22nd of May 2005, which implemented the 
InfoSoc Directive, added another sub-paragraph to Article 23bis (and to Article 
47bis for neighbouring rights), which aligned the Belgian Copyright Act with 
Article 6(4) of the Directive.127  Article 6(4), we recall, excludes online services 
from the list of copyright exceptions that have to comply with technological 
protection measures.  Copyright products accessible online, therefore, can also 
be subjected in Belgium to usage restrictions that are regulated by contract law. 
While in Europe advocates of the mandatory nature of copyright exceptions 
cite Belgium as an example to follow for its regulation of copyright and related 
rights,128 Séverine Dusollier, a Belgian commentator, expresses perplexity and 
dissatisfaction with the above norms.  First, she voices disappointment because 
the imperative nature of the exceptions is declared only with reference to 
contracts and not to technological protection measures.  She argues that, a 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Id. 
 123 Loi du 31 août 1998 transposant en droit belge la directive européenne n 96/9/CE du 11 
mars 1996 concernant la protection juridique des bases de données. 
 124 See F. Dubuisson, Le regime des exceptions au droit d‘auteur après la loi du 31 août 1998 concernant la 
protection juridique des bases de données 2001 AUTEURS ET MÉDIAS 200 (2001). 
 125 Id. at 214. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Loi du 22 mai 2005 transposant en droit belge la directive européenne 2011/29/CE du 22 
mai 2001 sur l‘harmonization de certains aspects du droit d‘auter et des droits voisins dans la 
société de l‘information. 
 128 See comments to the Green Paper of 2008 on ‗Copyright in the Knowledge Economy,‘ at  
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/libraryl=/copyright_neighbouring
/legislation_copyright&vm=detailed&sb=Title. 
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fortiori, that should have been the case.129  Second, she maintains that the 
exclusion of the copyright works accessible on demand from the purview of 
Article 23bis suggests that copyright exceptions, while mandatory for digital 
copyright works commercialised on a physical carrier (e.g., a CD or a DVD), are 
only optional when the same digital products are commercialised online via 
download.  This creates an unjustified two-tier system.130 
The status of the exceptions in Belgium, Dusollier argues, assumes a hybrid 
nature (mandatory and optional) depending on the means of diffusion of the 
work.131  The reasoning of the Belgian legislature, while adding the above 
exclusion for on-demand copyright works—that the online distribution of 
copyright goods has to be promoted—does not convince her.  She considers 
this argument fallacious, except perhaps for the exception for private copying.  
By declaring mandatory the exceptions for ―offline‖ digital works and entirely 
manageable by contract the exceptions for online digital works, the Belgian 
legislature indirectly encourages the practice of overriding copyright exceptions.  
It is regrettable, she concludes, that the Belgian legislature stopped halfway in a 
process that had commenced under the right auspices.132 
Existing case law in Belgium does not clarify the matter.  In the most 
notable case on copyright exceptions in the digital environment, Test-Achats v. 
EMI, the consumer association Test-Achats demanded that users be allowed to 
make a private reproduction of a music CD equipped with DRM impeding the 
reproduction.  The judge declared that the exception for private copying is only 
a ―legal immunity‖ against infringement and not a right.133  This ruling, 
therefore, leaves open both the question of the nature of other copyright 
exceptions (for example, those underpinned by fundamental rights) and the 
question of the overridability of copyright exceptions by contract and DRM.  
C.   IRELAND  
After relevant national and international pressure, Ireland adopted the 
Copyright Act of 2000,134 which was intended to adapt copyright legislation to 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Séverine Dusollier, La contractualisation de l‘utilisation des œuvres et l‘expérience belge des exceptions 
inpératives, 25 PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES 443, 451 (2007). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 452. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Tribunal de première instance [Civ] [court of first instance] Bruxelles, L‘ASBL Association 
Belge des Consommateurs TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded Music Belgium, Jugement du May 
25, 2004, N. 2004/46/A du rôle des référes. 
 134 The previous copyright legislation was the Copyright Act n. 10 of 1963, Copyright and 
Related Rights Act, 2000 (Act no. 38/2000) (Ir.), available at http://www.acts.oireachtas.ie/en.act. 
2000.0028.1.html. 
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the needs of the digital environment, and to implement the InfoSoc Directive.  
However, a few provisions of the Copyright Act 2000 departed from the 
InfoSoc Directive in its binding provisions, and, therefore, after an EU action 
brought against Ireland, the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2004 
were adopted.135  This Statutory Instrument introduced the exception for 
caching copy (temporary copyright within a system), and sanctioned a non-
interference of Rights Protection Measures with Permitted Acts.136  With the 
latter provision, all permitted acts are protected from TPMs unduly expanding 
copyright protection. 
The boundaries of copyright protection, including the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the originality requirement, are expressed in section 17(2) and 
(3) of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000.137  The requirement of 
originality for databases has also been added in the same statute to comply with 
the Database Directive.138 
The Irish Copyright Act provides an extremely detailed list of copyright 
exceptions.  They are grouped by category, under the subsections dedicated to: 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations (S.I. no. 16/2004) (Ir.). 
 136 Id. § 5: 
(1) Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as operating to prevent any 
person from undertaking the acts permitted - 
 (a) in relation to works protected by copyright under Chapter 6 of Part II, 
 (b) in relation to performances, by Chapter 4 of Part III, or 
 (c)  in relation to databases, by Chapter 8 of Part V. 
(2) Where the beneficiary is legally entitled to access the protected work or 
subject-matter concerned, the rightsholder shall make available to the 
beneficiary the means of benefiting from the permitted act, save where such 
work or other subject-matter has been made available to the public on agreed 
contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access the work 
or other subject-matter from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
(2) In the event of a dispute arising, the beneficiary may apply to the High Court 
for an order 
(3) requiring a person to do or to refrain from doing anything the doing or 
refraining from doing of which is necessary to ensure compliance by that person 
with the provisions of this section.‘ 
 137 Id. § 17: 
(2) Copyright subsists, in accordance with this Act, in— 
 (a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, 
 (b) sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable programmes, 
 (c) the typographical arrangement of published editions, and 
 (d) original databases. 
(3) Copyright protection shall not extend to the ideas and principles which underlie 
any element of a work, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts and, in respect of original databases, shall not extend to their contents 
and is without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents. 
 138 Catherine M. Conneely, Ireland‘s Copyright Act 2000: Copyright Legislation for the New Millennium, 
24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‘L L. REV. 179, 198 (2000). 
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education, libraries and archives, public administration, design, computer 
programs, original databases, typefaces, works in electronic form, and a 
miscellaneous section.  The exception for private copying is reserved to 
domestic recording for the purpose of time shifting.139 
On the mandatory nature of the exceptions, Section 2(10) of the Copyright 
Act 2000 states: ―Where an act which would otherwise infringe any of the rights 
conferred by this Act is permitted under this Act it is irrelevant whether or not 
there exists any term or condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit 
or restrict that act.‖  At first sight, the Irish provision seems broader than the 
corresponding legal provisions of Belgium and Portugal, and seems to cover all 
copyright limits.  In fact, since it uses the term ―rights,‖ it can be said to refer to 
economic rights, rather than copyright as such, and thus to exceptions only and 
not all copyright limits, so that the meaning of the section is similar to its 
Portuguese and Belgian equivalent.  Regrettably, no case law or literature, at a 
national or European level, has commented in detail or the reasons for such a 
choice of the Irish legislature.  It is unclear, therefore, whether it is based on the 
nature of the exceptions or on utilitarian principles.  Moreover, no empirical 
studies have been carried out on the impact that such provisions had on the 
local copyright industry.  
D.   PORTUGAL 
Copyright in Portugal is regulated by the Code of Author‘s Rights and 
Related Rights (Código do Direito de Autor e dos Direitos Conexos — 
CDADC) of the 14th of March 1985, which has been modified by the statutes 
implementing the Software Directive,140 the Rental Rights Directive,141 the 
Satellite-Cable Directive,142 the Copyright Term Directive,143 the Database 
Directive,144 the Term Directive 1993,145 and the InfoSoc Directive.146  The 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Copyright Act 2000 § 101. 
 140 Decreto-Lei n. 252/94, Oct. 20, 1994.  
 141 Council Directive 92/100, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61–66 (EC) (governing rental right and lending 
right and certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property).  Decreto-Lei n. 
332/97, Nov. 27, 1997. 
 142 Council Directive 93/83, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15–20 (EC) (governing coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and 
cable retransmission).  Decreto-Lei n. 333/97, Nov. 27, 1997.  
 143 Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9–13 (EC) (harmonizing the term of protection 
of copyright and certain related rights).  Decreto-Lei 334/97, Nov. 27, 1997. 
 144 Decreto-Lei n. 122/2000, July 4, 2000.  
 145 Decreto-Lei n. 334/97, Nov. 27, 1997.  
 146 Decreto-Lei n. 24/2006, June 30, 2006. 
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matter also is regulated by the law on remuneration of private copying and by 
the law on collecting societies.147 
The conditions for the protection of copyright works, and, therefore, the 
exclusion of copyright protection according to the idea-expression dichotomy 
and—indirectly—to the originality requirement, are enshrined in Article 2 of 
the CDADC.  Further, exhaustion of the distribution right and copyright 
duration are stipulated by the above legislation in line with the corresponding 
directives. 
The system of copyright exceptions provides for an exhaustive list, which is 
strictly interpreted by courts.148  After the implementation of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the list presents the following exceptions in Article 75: 
● Caching copy 
● Private copying (on paper), except for musical scores 
● Reproduction and public communication of summaries or 
excerpts, or speeches 
● Press review 
● Reproduction and communication of short extracts of literary 
works in current affairs report 
● Copying by libraries and museums, for loan and archiving, 
non-profit 
● Teaching (non-commercial) 
● Quotation for criticism or teaching 
● Disabled persons 
● Public performance of national anthems, patriotic chants, or 
religious works and practices 
● Inclusion for promotion of expositions or sales/auctions 
● News reporting 
● Public security and administrative or judiciary proceedings 
● Research and private study (with dedicated terminals and 
within library premises) of works that are not available for sale 
or licensing 
● Reproduction by social institutions 
● Architectural works and sculptures placed in public places 
● Incidental inclusion 
● Demonstrative or maintenance purposes, including buildings, 
their drawings and plans 
                                                                                                                   
 147 Decreto-Lei n. 62/98, of Sept. 1, 1998.  The complete legislation on copyright in Portugal is 
accessible at http://www.gpeari.pt (Law n. 83/2001 of the 1st of August). 
 148 See ALAI 2008, Portuguese Report. 
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● Distribution of works lawfully reproduced, when justified by 
the act of reproduction.149 
Citation requirements and fair compensation are also provided for in some 
instances.  
Moreover, private copying is regulated by a dedicated article (Article 81) 
which exempts the reproduction only for scientific or humanistic purposes 
when the work is not available for sale or is impossible to retrieve elsewhere 
(only one copy is allowed).  The personal copy, subjected to the three-step 
test—which does not affect the normal exploitation of the work and does not 
bring unjustified prejudice to the interests of the author150—cannot be 
communicated to the public and cannot be commercialised. 
In consequence of the implementation in the Portuguese legislation of the 
Software Directive and of the Database Directive, the corresponding imperative 
exceptions have been incorporated.  Therefore, back-up copying and 
observation, study, and testing of a computer program are allowed, and not 
overridable by contract.151  The same is true for the decompilation of computer 
software aimed at achieving inter-operability.152  Likewise, the normal utilization 
of a database is guaranteed against contracts.153 
For the exceptions to the exclusive rights of the author, the Portuguese 
Copyright Act provides for protection against contracts.  Article 75(5) of the 
CDADC, states that ―any contractual clause which aims to eliminate or impede 
the normal exercise by the beneficiaries of the uses listed in paragraphs 1, 2 and 
3 of this article [which the law calls ‗free uses‘] is null and void‖154 without 
prejudice to contractual arrangements about the modes of exercise, in particular 
to establish the amount of fair compensation.155 
All copyright exceptions in the Portuguese copyright legislation are thus 
protected against contracting, similarly to the Irish legislation and the Belgian 
law.156 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Free translation and summaries by the author. 
 150 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1986, as 
revised on July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 art. 9.2 (1971): ―It shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.‖ 
 151 Decreto-Lei n. 252/94, art. 6, Oct. 20, 1994. 
 152 Id. art. 7. 
 153 Decreto-lei n. 122/2000, art. 9, July 4, 2000. 
 154 Translation by Patricia Akester, University of Cambridge. 
 155 Translation by the author. 
 156 See Dubuisson, supra note 124, at 213. 
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E.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the above examined countries adopt different approaches to 
the relationship between copyright exceptions and contracts.  Some leave them 
to private ordering, some select few exceptions and declare them imperative, 
and some protect all exceptions from contracts and technical locks.  Apart from 
Belgium, there is no sufficient analysis of this legislation, in the literature or in 
the case law of the examined countries, to clarify the reasons of the choice of 
the respective legislators (e.g., whether the underpinning justifications for 
copyright limits determine their resistance to contracts).  Moreover, there is no 
empirical research reviewing the impact of these different regulations on the 
relationship between owners and users of copyright works.  In sum, it is 
difficult to understand whether legislation providing for imperative copyright 
exceptions helps users to benefit from them or harms the interests of rights 
holders.  In addition, apart from Portuguese law, which seems clear on the 
point, it is unclear whether the whole contract or simply the clause overriding 
the exception will be void (art. 9(1) of the Software Directive, 15 of the 
Database Directive and section 36(4) of the CDPA are good examples of such 
confusion). 
V.  ACADEMIC COMMENTARY 
A. CONTRACTS OVERRIDE USERS‘ FREEDOMS 
Contracts have always been part of the copyright law scenario.157  They are 
essential to the correct implementation of the copyright system.158  Authors and 
publishers use contracts to define the profit sharing deriving from copyright 
protection.  Commercial copyright users arrange with authors or their 
representatives (often collecting societies) the terms of use of creative works.  
Private users purchase copyrighted works on analogue media (e.g., a book) 
under the standard terms of a sale contract.  These contracts in the digital 
environment take the form of licences, setting the usage rules of a given 
copyrighted product.159  This is how we see the emergence, in relation with 
digital copyright works, of standard form electronic contracts, such as shrink-
wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap licenses. 
Electronic licences, whose terms are determined by the rights holder, leave 
no room for negotiation to the user, who is confronted with a ‗take it or leave 
it‘ choice.  They are therefore different from arms-length contracts, in which 
                                                                                                                   
 157 Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Its Substitutes, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 865, 866 (1997). 
 158 David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 63 (1999). 
 159 Id. 
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the consent of both parties is fully informed and freely expressed.160  Some 
literature suggests that these licences are not contracts at all.  They, therefore, 
do not require consent from the user.  They are unilateral actions by which the 
owner exercises her property right, and indicates to the user which uses of her 
property she wishes to exclude.  It is, in sum, a permission to use a property 
that is subject to conditions.161 
From the point of view of the end users, these licences are often too long.  
Some suggest that, in practice, users do not read them in the ever-speeding 
internet environment, but they regret having agreed to them when they learn 
what their terms are.162 
Moreover, end-user licences are often worded in legal jargon, unintelligible 
to common users.163  But even when they are comprehensible, they ―are not as 
clear as the indication of the price of a product.‖  This means that the user is 
unable to fully determine the real impact of the terms and conditions on her 
interest.  For example, she cannot know in advance whether she will be inspired 
by the content of that particular creative work to produce further creations.164  
Despite the above, some case law in the United States has held shrink-wrap 
licences enforceable, even when the user expressed only minimal assent.165  
Furthermore, often the contract is bundled with the digital copyrighted 
work: either it is written on the product (e.g., on a music CD) or it pops up in 
the reading device at the first or every utilization of the product (e.g., in 
computer software). This means that not only the original buyer of the product, 
but also each and every person subsequently utilising it is bound by the terms of 
the agreement.  In this way, the right in personam of the owner, obtained by 
contract, bears the characteristics of a right in rem, like a property right.166 
On this point, Elkin-Koren argues that the outcome of cases like ProCD167 
in the United States suggests as acceptable a total contractual control on every 
access to the copyright work, not only by the original contractor (the purchaser) 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1096. 
 161 Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 93, 98 (1997). 
 162 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 461 n.5 (2006) (citing Nathaniel 
Good et al., Stopping Spyware at the Gate: A User Study of Privacy, Notice and Spyware 1–10 (Minn. L. 
Rev., Working Paper, 2003)); see also id. at 463, n.10 (relating an anecdote according to which a 
company put in its end-user licence agreement (EULA) that it would pay a prize to anyone who 
read the terms of use). 
 163 See Guibault, supra note 5, at 119 (citing Jaques Ghestin, Traité de droit civil - La formation 
du contrat 367 (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence ed., 1993) (Fr.)).  
 164 Elkin-Koren, supra note 161, at 8. 
 165 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 166 Elkin-Koren, supra note 161, at 9. 
 167 86 F.3d at 1447. The ProCD decision will be discussed below. 
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but also by every following user.  In this way, the contract creates rights that are 
similar to property rights, enforceable against everybody.  After the ProCD case, 
in practice, no third party will be allowed to use a CD without being bound by 
the original contract between the offerer and the purchaser.168  Elkin-Koren 
rejects the argument that copyright and contract do not hinder each other 
because the first creates initial entitlement and the second merely regulates the 
transfer of the entitlements.169  Although the contract cannot operate on the 
initial entitlement, she argues, it can operate on the final outcome of the rights 
on this entitlement, and the final result is often contrary to copyright policy.170 
A few other copyright commentators maintain that end-user licences can 
override the privileges of the users.171  For example, most terms and conditions 
within those licences forbid any use or copy of the work, for whatever purpose, 
thereby impeding the exercise of fundamental freedoms like citation, criticism, 
parody, and transformative works.172  Yet, abiding by the terms of the contract 
can become a pre-condition for the user to benefit from copyright exceptions. 
Dusollier argues, for example, that in order to benefit from the exceptions 
the use has to be ―lawful.‖  The lawful use has been defined in several EU 
directives, in different terms, as the person who ―has lawfully acquired the 
work,‖173 the person that has the right to access the work (by law or by 
contract),174 or the person regularly licensed to access (by contract) from the 
owner.175  In all the above definitions, the importance of the role of the contract 
is obvious.  The user cannot benefit from a copyright exception by her own 
initiative—for example, by performing a reproduction that is forbidden by 
                                                                                                                   
 168 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 161, at 94–98 (discussing ProCD). 
 169 Id. at 56. 
 170 Id. at 47. 
 171 See, e.g., Michel Vivant, La limitation ou ‗Réduction‘ des Exceptions au Droit d‘auteur par 
Contrats ou Mesures Techniques de Protection: De possibles Contrepoids, General Report, 
Proceedings of the ALAI Study Days, 19–20 june Barcelona, 2006, 5/8 (2008) (Sp.), available at 
http://www.alai.org. 
 172 Guibault, supra note 5, at 119; IViR, supra note 66, Pt. I; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: Foreword to a Symposium, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999); 
Urs Gasser et al., iTunes, How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the Business of Digital Media: A 
Case Study, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School Research Publication 
No. 2004-07 (2004); Vinje, supra note 16, at 192. 
 173 See Dusollier, supra note 10, at 453 (noting consistence with the definition of the Software 
Directive, and support by part of the literature).   
 174 Consistent with the InfoSoc Directive and with the Belgian Copyright Law.  This construct 
is debated within the literature; certain commentators find that a lawful user by law is a 
beneficiary of a copyright exception.  Others state this reasoning is circular.  For the full debate 
see id. at 451; see also Vinciane Vanovermeire, The Concept of the Lawful Use of a Database in the 
European Database Directive, 31 Int‘l Rev. of Indus. and Copyright L. 63 (2000). 
 175 Consistent with the Database Directive and supported by another part of the literature.  See 
Dusollier, supra note 10, at 454. 
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contract but allowed by a copyright exception—without becoming an unlawful 
user who cannot benefit from copyright exceptions. The only available 
remedy—far more costly and time-consuming—would be to resort to courts or 
mediation boards.  In this way, the construct of a lawful user is used by owners 
as a supplementary tool to control and restrict copyright exceptions.176 
Contract not only threatens copyright exceptions, but all copyright limits.  
The first-sale principle, for example, which allows a lawful purchaser to resell 
the product on the second-hand market, finds no place in the digital 
environment.  If the licence prevents any copying of the work, for whatever 
purpose, this entails that reselling, lending, and giving away the work is 
forbidden.177  Also, the copyright duration could be endangered by the licences 
―in perpetuity,‖ granted by the copyright owner.178  
In the views of the above literature, in sum, the balance between the 
exclusive rights of the owner and the access privileges of the user created by 
copyright is hindered by the implementation of contract and technology,179 and 
so is the ultimate goal of copyright: the circulation of culture.  Rigid control on 
access to copyright content, enabled by contracts and technology, produces 
negative externalities like stifling new creative processes.180  The only way to 
avoid this dysfunction of the digital copyright is to subject these contracts to 
the principles that inform copyright law.181 
In more detail, copyright law should require that each contract including a 
clause incompatible with copyright legislation is null and void.  To this end, the 
implementation of imperative copyright exceptions, which would not be 
overridable by contract, has been deemed necessary.  Some reckon the 
imperative exceptions should be those underpinned by fundamental rights;182 
                                                                                                                   
 176 Id. 
 177 Kieth Kupferschmida, Lost In Cyberspace: The Digital Demise Of The First-Sale Doctrine, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825 (1998); see also Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 306 (1996) (foreseeing this scenario). 
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others point at those enabling productive uses, able to foster innovation;183 
some also add the exceptions likely to have an impact on the internal market.184  
Another part of the literature believes that the whole copyright law, with all its 
exclusions, limited economic rights, and exceptions should preempt contracts 
infringing its provisions.185  Finally, others suggest that there should be a clause 
in supra-national copyright law that declares null and void clauses in standard 
form contracts incompatible with copyright law.186  It has been argued that, in 
an increasingly borderless market, national copyright laws will not suffice to 
provide an effective safeguard for users‘ entitlements, and therefore we need to 
resort to legal frameworks outside copyright law and at a supra-national level.187 
Alternatively, instead of the modification of current copyright legislation, a 
correct interpretation of its principles could be sufficient.  To this end, the 
fundamental function of copyright needs to be taken as a guideline.188  The 
interpretation of copyright and of its limits should be underpinned by its 
democratic function, rather than by its utilitarian justifications.  Thus contracts 
overriding copyright limits would be preempted by copyright law.189  In short, 
even in the absence of an express indication in copyright laws, courts should 
hold unenforceable end-user agreements incompatible with copyright law.190  
In conclusion, in the view of the above literature, while contracts have 
always been part of copyright, they have often created an imbalance between 
the interested parties.  Initially, the authors were victims of the overreaching 
bargaining power of the publishers and legislators enacted norms intended to 
protect them.  Now, end-users are the weakest party in the relationship among 
copyright players.  To assist them, either legislators should take normative 
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action, or courts should inform their interpretation of copyright law in a 
different way. 
B.  CONTRACTS ARE MORE EFFICIENT THAN COPYRIGHT 
Another stream of the literature is significantly more positive on the effects 
of private ordering on copyright law.  These authors reckon that contracts and 
technological protection measures are more efficient than public policing.  This 
is because the law is not capable of quickly adapting to the needs of copyright 
users, whereas the market is able to generate the most efficient transaction 
terms, for the benefit of both owners and users.  Fair use and other instruments 
to address traditional copyright market failures would then safely be replaced by 
―fared use.‖191  
This stance in the copyright literature is based on the assumption that 
copyright limits are based on the inefficiencies of the market—mainly, the 
impossibility of negotiating licences one-by-one with individual end-users.  
Digital technology bypasses this market failure by offering an individual 
negotiation.  Thus, the use of public policy tools to regulate copyright matters is 
no longer necessary, and the interaction between owners and users is left to the 
more efficient instrument of private ordering.  Thanks to price 
discrimination,192 for example, users will get only the usage privileges they are 
ready to pay for.  This, in the final analysis, will not restrict users‘ privileges, it 
will broaden them.193  Against this scenario, it has been argued that information 
goods cannot be completely commodified because of their peculiar 
characteristics.  They are inherently different from other commodities, and 
therefore they cannot be efficiently subjected to the laws of the market.194 
Private agreements are also saluted as a vehicle for opportunities, rather than 
as threats in the field of open-access licences.195  These are new ways in which 
authors and creators can make available their work to the general public—
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normally on the Internet—without charges, but under given terms and 
conditions (e.g., ―some rights reserved‖).  The General Public Licence (GPL), 
originally issued by the GNU Project, is designed for software developers.196  
Literary works instead can be licensed under the Creative Common (CC) 
terms.197  These new forms of licensing are thought to facilitate access to 
copyrighted works by the broadest possible share of the public, while at the 
same time protecting authors from abuse and misuse of their creations.  
According to some, open-access contracts are a perfect fit for the borderless 
digital environment, unlike copyright law.  By acting worldwide, these contracts 
offer unprecedented opportunities to improve the general functioning of the 
copyright system.198  
However, some commentators are cautious on this issue.  According to 
Elkin-Koren, for example, the multiple choices offered by CC licences augment 
the costs of information searching for users of CC works.  This, in turn, ends 
up screening access to information rather than facilitating it.199  Moreover, 
Dusollier200 argues that the culture and philosophy at the basis of CC and GNU 
projects can lead to unintentional negative consequences.  In particular, the 
focus on the user and her need to access copyright works shadows the interests 
of the author.  CC authors selflessly make available their creations to the public, 
for the benefit of the circulation of culture.  But the diffusion of this type of 
licensing generates the expectation that all works of art should be made 
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available for free.  Moreover, the tool utilised by open-access projects to 
provide an alternative to the existing copyright system is ironically the same tool 
that the copyright industry is using to tip the balance of copyright towards the 
owner: the ―viral‖ contract.   This type of contract stipulates terms and 
conditions that bind not only the first user, but also every following user of the 
work.  Thanks to ―viral‖ contracts, the rights enforceable on the copyright work 
are more similar to property rights than to contractual rights.201   Open-source 
licensing system is therefore criticised with the same arguments opposing 
commercial electronic licences. 
C.   COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACTS ARE INDEPENDENT 
Between contract supporters and contract detractors, however, there is a 
third stream of copyright commentators.  While not necessarily supporting an 
expansion of the use of contracts to regulate copyright matters, some are not at 
all concerned by the effects of private contracting on the copyright balance.  
Contracts and copyright are somewhat symbiotic systems, that coexist, serve, 
and help each other.  They do not risk hindering each other, because they 
impact on different legal areas. Copyright is generally regulated by international 
law (implemented in national law), it creates rights in rem (enforceable erga 
omnes), and it creates initial entitlements only. Contracts instead are generally 
regulated by national law, they create rights in personam (enforceable only against 
the contractors) and regulate the subsequent transfer of entitlements.  
Moreover, fair use and the first-sale principle are not endangered by contracts 
because these are default norms that apply only in the absence of an 
arrangement between the parties.202  
For other commentators, the current legislation, correctly interpreted, is 
sufficient to rein in copyright‘s excesses.203  They reckon that a strict solution 
like rendering imperative copyright exceptions would be ―too inflexible.‖204  A 
similar solution cannot but be an extrema ratio: only a strong positive policy 
implication can justify overriding the freedom of parties to negotiate their 
agreements.205  Moreover, on a practical note, the financial implications of the 
interference of contract on copyright are held to be minimal.  Even when the 
contract modifies copyright entitlements, remedies offered by contract law are 
far from being as onerous as those offered by copyright law.  This is because, in 
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the case of breach of contract, all the owner can do is demand monetary 
damages in proportion to the real injury suffered, and the amount of these is 
likely to be minimal.206  
In conclusion, the examined literature is divided among supporters of a legal 
action (normative or interpretative) to be taken in favour of copyright users, 
those who would phase out copyright law in favour of contracts, and those that 
deem the status quo to be sufficiently balanced.  In the absence of empirical 
data on the impact on users of electronic licences, it is impossible to correctly 
evaluate these arguments.  Moreover, different types of contract may be used 
depending on the type of user of copyrighted works and on the sector (e.g., 
database, software, music, film sectors).  The following section reviews the 
different licensing agreements and explores their potential impact on users.  
D. COPYRIGHT WORKS AND THEIR COMMERCIALISATION 
A wilful consent from a party to an agreement is important to determine the 
enforceability of that agreement against that party. Even in some recent case 
law, where minimal forms of assent were deemed to be sufficient to hold a 
purchaser bound to the terms of the contract,207 the possibility to accept or 
reject the terms of the agreement was held crucial.208  While fully negotiated 
arm-length contracts presume wilful consent from all parties, and therefore do 
not raise this type of issues, standard form contracts, especially when entrusted 
to the jacket of a CD or to a URL on a web page, may create some problems.  
In order to explore the potential extent of these problems, it is useful to 
determine what share of copyrighted products is commercialised with the 
former or the latter form of contract. The analysis is organised by sector of 
copyright users:  consumers; libraries and universities, and commercial users. 
 1.  Consumers.  Although official data on this issue are missing, a growing 
share of the digital copyright commerce (B2C) seems to take place through 
electronic standard form contracts. This can be inferred from the figures on the 
diffusion of electronic commerce (e-commerce), which normally deploys this 
type of agreement, and in the field of copyright take the form of licences.209  
                                                                                                                   
 206 See supra note 172, at 18; Nimmer et al., supra note 158, at 63. 
 207 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 208 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 209 See John Kennedy, Music has embraced the future with new business models  will governments secure a 
future for digital content?, in IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009, at 4, http://www.ifpi.org/content/ 
library/DMR2009.pdf; see also Commission of the European Communities, Report on Cross-border 
E-commerce in the EU (May 3, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/ 
com_staff_wp2009_en.pdf (describing the diffusion of e-commerce in the EU and reporting that 
on average, among twenty-seven EU member states, 30%–40% of copyrighted goods are sold 
online; the number reaches 70% in more ―mature‖ markets like the U.K., France, and Germany); 
2010] USER CONTRACTS (‗DEMAND SIDE‘)  39 
 
For the purpose of this study, we will divide electronic licences in three types: 
(a) shrink-wrap, (b) click-wrap, and (c) browse-wrap.   
The terms and conditions of shrink-wrap licences, when they are 
enforceable, are binding for the purchaser from the moment the packaging of 
the product is open.  Click-wrap licences require the user to read the terms and 
conditions before proceeding with the purchase, and to accept them by clicking 
a button carrying ―I agree,‖ or ―I accept,‖ or other similar formulas.  For 
browse-wrap licences, the terms and conditions are accessible via a link on the 
front-page of the website.  It is irrelevant whether the user has effectively read 
them or understood them.  It is sufficient for the acceptance of the agreement 
that the user ―utilizes‖ the website.210  
Some digital copyright works can be accessed on a physical medium (e.g., 
CDs or DVDs) which can be purchased or rented on the internet or in a shop.  
These products sometimes have terms and conditions external to the packaging, 
sometimes internal. Some others have a notice exterior to the package referring 
to terms and conditions inside.211  For example, when the transaction involves 
the purchase of computer software on a material carrier, like a CD, the terms of 
the licence are often printed in the instruction manual, or on a separate booklet 
that can be found in the package.212  On the other hand, when a music CD is 
purchased, the terms and conditions are succinctly printed on the disk (and 
sometimes, but not always, on the jacket too).213  Video DVDs show a longer 
copyright notice before displaying the content.214  Between the purchaser and 
the retailer, normal conditions of sale apply.  However, between the rights 
holder and the final purchaser, the licence regulates the agreement.  To digital 
products commercialised on a physical carrier, the doctrine of shrink-wrap 
licences applies.215  
The above products can also be purchased directly in digital form.  They can 
be downloaded from a website to the computer of the purchaser, and they do 
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not require either packaging or delivery fees.  For these products, click-wrap (or 
click-through, or click-on) contracts are more common.216  
Music compilations or tunes, audio books, and multimedia material (games 
and films) are nowadays increasingly commercialised online, via download.  
This trend is particularly recent for video material because of technological 
progress and the diffusion of powerful broadband connections.  The most 
popular online service specialised in downloadable music (and now also films) is 
Apple iTunes, which accounts for the biggest market share of copyright digital 
products.217  This service involves the use of proprietary software to sell the 
products, and it implements click-wrap licenses to set users‘ restrictions relating 
to the software and the products, and browse-wrap licences for the use of the 
website.218  
Also photo, image, and footage stocks or collections are nowadays mostly 
licensed online (although CD versions still exist), and they implement click-
wrap contracts.219 
Finally, online newspapers and magazines, whose diffusion on the market is 
increasing every year,220 are often commercialised via browse-wrap licences.  
This is a common practice in the copyright management of websites.  However, 
some of them only report on the front page the indication, ―© All Rights 
Reserved,‖ or something similar.  No data are available on the share of 
websites/services implementing the former or the latter practice. 
To conclude the examination of digital products destined to private 
consumers, some business models that propose standard-form contracts in 
more traditional forms need to be mentioned. These are providers that often 
propose ―bundles‖ of digital copyright products and hardware.  Examples are 
cellphones able to play music and videos, or TV services via cable or via 
Internet.221   These products are commercialised either in shops or online, and 
they involve the purchase or rental of a material product (for example, phone, 
set-top box, router) and the subscription of a service, through standard-form 
contracts.  
Most of the information products considered above are commercialised 
through standard-form contracts.  As mentioned above, the terms of those 
types of contract are integrally set by the owner of the copyright work.  This 
suggested to some authors that the position of the user is weak, and it needs 
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special protection.222  This argument is refuted by others maintaining that 
standard form contracts are perfectly acceptable in contract law because the 
user has the choice to buy or not to buy the product, and the impact of this 
choice on industry‘s policies should not be underestimated.  When many users 
refuse to buy a product with over-restrictive terms of use, the owner is likely to 
change them.223   The main debate in copyright literature and case law, however, 
concerns the enforceability of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap 
licences. 
  a.  The Enforceability of Electronic Contracts.  The status of shrink-wrap, 
click-wrap, and browse-wrap licences is all but certain at the international level.  
Shrink-wrap contracts in the U.S. are held enforceable in some states (see 
ProCD)224 and not enforceable in other states (see Vault).225  Many variables 
have to be considered: the juridical nature of the purchaser (natural or legal 
person—that is, private or professional user);226 the opportunity for the 
acceptant to have knowledge of the contract terms;227 and the possibility to 
accept or reject the agreement and to return the product free of charges.228  
Common law instruments (e.g., the doctrine of unconscionability, the misuse of 
right, etc.) can be called upon to protect copyright users on a case-by-case basis, 
along with consumer protection instruments and antitrust law (see infra, 
SECTION D).229  
In the U.S., the legal doctrine is divided.  While some express concerns 
about the minimal level of assent230 sufficient to enforce shrink-wrap licences, 
others are in favour of upholding them.  They argue that a contract exists 
without formalities, by the fact that both parties have voluntarily started to 
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deliver their performance.231   Therefore, in the U.S. the validity of shrink-wrap 
licences is unclear.232 
In Europe, some courts will not hold them enforceable because the terms of 
the contract are known by the purchaser only after she entered the 
transaction.233  Moreover, the indication on the jacket of the CD or on the disk 
itself that no copy is allowed is not considered a term of a contract, but rather a 
notice that copyright law applies, and therefore it is valid only to the extent to 
which it recalls the provisions of the respective national copyright law.234  In 
France, some legal commentators suggested that shrink-wrap contracts could be 
enforceable, provided that the user is aware of assenting to the terms of the 
contract by opening the package.235  However, no case law confirms such 
interpretation.  
Also in the U.K., no case law exists on the specific matter of shrink-wrap 
licences, although some commentators have expressed scepticism on their 
enforceability.236  We can only infer that case law on standard form contracts in 
general (the ―ticket cases‖)237 would be recalled in similar matters.  In Scotland, 
a shrink-wrap licence has been held valid, but, according to commentators, this 
case is of little help to clarify the possible fate of this type of agreement in the 
rest of Europe.238  Some other principles may be used to set aside such 
contracts.  As they are applicable generally to all contracts, they will be reviewed 
in section 3.4.1. Click-wrap contracts, on the contrary, are generally held valid 
both in the U.S. and the EU.239  In Europe, the enforceability of such contracts 
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is confirmed by Article 9(1) of the E-commerce Directive,240 and some 
European case law has upheld them.241 
Finally, browse-wrap licenses, which are able to bind the user only by the 
fact of being available for consultation in the first page of the website or 
service, are held enforceable by some U.S. courts,242 although some literature is 
highly sceptic about their validity.243   In a seminal case on this matter, Specht v. 
Netscape,244 a ―terms of use‖ link at the bottom of a page was not considered 
binding for the user, with the argument that, for a contract to be binding, both 
parties need to know the terms of the contract and to agree to them.  
However, subsequent case law (Register.com,245 eBay246) refuted this argument.  
In Register.com v. Verio the fact that Verio did not indicate assent by clicking the 
―I agree‖ button was rejected.  Moreover, in eBay, even a mining data robot 
from the eBay website was held capable of infringement; the judges argued that 
a person engaging an electronic agent ―selected for making an authentication, 
performance, or agreement, including manifestation of assent, is bound by the 
operation of the electronic agent, even if no individual was aware of or 
reviewed the agent‘s operations or the result of the operations.‖247  The fact that 
the infringer in these two cases was a commercial entity, though, might have 
heavily weighed on the decision. This may suggest that browse-wrap licences 
are normally enforceable against professional users and not enforceable against 
private consumers.248  Rulings by European courts on similar circumstances are 
still to come.249 
  b. The Terms of the Electronic Licences.  No empirical study has been 
undertaken on the real impact of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, or browse-wrap 
licences on copyright limits.  They commonly implement different terms and 
                                                                                                                   
 240 Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
 241 See Association Familles de France v. SA Père-Noel.fr, Trib. de Grande Instance [T.G.I.] 
[court of first instance] Feb. 4 2003 (Fr.); Netwise v. NTS Computers, Rechtbank Rotterdam, 5 
December 2002, in Computerrecht 2003/ 02, at 149. 
 242 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); but see Specht, infra note 244.  
 243 Lemley, supra note 162, at 464–65. 
 244 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 245 Register.com, 356 F.3d 393. 
 246 eBay v. Bidder‘s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 247 Uniform Computer Transactions Act (UCITA) § 107(d), cited H. Deveci, Consent in Online 
Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles, 13 C.T.L.R. 223, 229 (2007). 
 248 Lemley, supra note 162, at 464–65. 
 249 A threatened action from the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) against Derrick Coetzee, an 
administrator of Wikipedia, for copying more than 3000 high resolution images from its database, 
could shed some light on the matter if brought to court.  The NPG argued the application of 
U.K. law, and breach of a browse-wrap contract.  For more information, see http://www.francis 
davey.co.uk/2009/07/national-portrait-gallery-photographs.html and http://www.technollama. 
co.uk/national-portrait-gallery-copyright-row.  
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conditions, on the basis of the commercialised product and of the type of 
contract, and therefore they would need an analytic and systematic study in 
order to be correctly assessed. 
However, a few commentators have analysed one or more of these standard 
form contracts as a case study or as ―samples‖ of a growing phenomenon.  
iTunes, for example, has often been chosen as a case study.250  The choice is not 
without justification; iTunes leads unchallenged the world market of music 
services, and the terms and conditions of its competitors cannot but be more 
permissive, if they want to gain a place in the market.  However, iTunes 
presents some drawbacks as a case study.  This service has peculiar 
characteristics that do not qualify it as an ―average‖ service.  It subjects the 
purchase of its products to the use of proprietary software, and it obliges its 
customers to buy specific hardware (e.g., Apple iPod) in order to use its 
products.251  Other services instead offer single music tracks or albums to 
download, without the use of any specific software, relying on terms and 
conditions accessible from the front page of the service.252  Their products are 
normally compatible with most music players. 
iTunes and the other services analysed by the literature commonly include in 
their clauses statements like: ―you shall not copy, distribute, publish, perform, 
modify, download, transmit, transfer, sell, license, reproduce, create derivative 
works from or based upon, distribute, post, publicly display, frame, link, or in 
any other way exploit any of the Site Content.‖  The commentators that have 
analysed these statements have found that they might pose problems with some 
copyright limits and exceptions (namely, fair use).253 
Photographic stock services such as Corbis254 and Getty,255 which license 
online photographic material and footage, have not been studied like iTunes.  
However, a few passages of Corbis terms and conditions, for example, seem to 
indicate the same basis for concern.  Passages in Corbis EULA terms include 
the following: 
3(c) . . . ‗The rights granted under this Paragraph include the right 
to make the Royalty-Free Content available to ten (10) separate 
individuals (cumulatively over the Term) for the sole purpose of 
                                                                                                                   
 250 Gasser, supra note 172; Lars Grondal, DRM and Contract Terms, 2 INDICARE MONITOR No. 
12 (2006), available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleID=177.  
 251 iTunes is currently launching DRM-free music tracks that can be played on all devices.  
 252 This is true for music services, like Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/MP3-Music-
Download), but not for video services, which normally, like iTunes, use proprietary software.  See 
http://www.netflix.com and http://www.cinemanow.com. 
 253 Gasser, supra note 172; Grondal, supra note 250; Bechtold, supra note 71. 
 254 Corbis Images, http://www.corbis.org. 
 255 Getty Images, http://www.gettyimages.com. 
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manipulating or otherwise using the Royalty-Free Content to 
create the End Use according to the terms provided herein 
(‗Users‘), in any and all media now known or hereafter devised.‘ 
. . . 
4 . . . ‗Any right, title or interest arising in any compilation or 
derivative work created using any Content shall not entitle You to 
use any Content except as permitted hereunder . . .‖256 
According to the above, royalty-free pictures allow a limited private copy 
allowance (embedded into the fair use doctrine).  On the other hand, 
transformative works are made difficult.  However, royalty-free pictures are 
often not protected by copyright, and therefore any usage restriction on them 
could be interpreted as an abuse.  Services like Corbis, in fact, have been 
questioned by copyright commentators because they license images that have 
fallen in the public domain.257  Like the other similar services mentioned in this 
study, analytical research is needed to clarify how, and to what extent, these 
terms of use depart from copyright legislation. 
In conclusion, while the above case studies clearly suggest the potential 
problems caused by overreaching terms and conditions to the entitlements of 
copyright works users, the real extent of such problems needs to be carefully 
measured by systematic empirical studies before identifying its policy 
implications. 
2.  Libraries and Educational Institutions.  Among publicly-funded institutions, 
libraries are certainly the most affected by usage restrictions in copyright 
contracting.  A recent empirical study carried out on the impact of DRM on the 
beneficiaries of copyright exceptions revealed that technological protection 
measures are not the main obstacle for libraries to access copyright works.258 
In the course of this study, Benjamin White, the Publishing Licensing and 
Copyright Compliance Manager of the British Library, was interviewed by 
Patricia Akester, and declared that the biggest challenge faced by the British 
Library is not the technology but the licensing practices.  He stated: ―Most of 
the licences imposed on the [British Library] are more restrictive than copyright 
law, including restrictions around copying, such as, only copy one per cent, 
copy once, only copy in the same medium or no wholesale copying, which 
prevent archiving and interlibrary loans.‖259 
                                                                                                                   
 256 Corbis Content License Agreement, http://www.Corbisimages.com/Content/LicenseInfo/ 
Certified_EULA_US.pdf. 
 257 Grosheide, supra note 11, at 324. 
 258 Akester, supra note 75. 
 259 Id. at 36. 
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The British Library carried out an empirical study on contracts that have 
been proposed by the copyright industry.260 They examined 100 contracts and 
found that 90% of them did not allow for at least one of the following: (1) 
archiving; (2) downloading and electronic copying; (3) fair dealing; (4) use by 
visually impaired; (5) inter-library loan.  Moreover, they found that the contracts 
did not make reference to any exceptions from the U.K. copyright law or from 
another jurisdiction.  In the conclusion of this study, the British Library 
required the U.K. government to take action against this practice of the 
copyright industry, in order to preserve the national literary patrimony.261  They 
also submitted their position on copyright exceptions to the European 
Commission.262 
No other empirical study on contracts with public libraries and university 
libraries has been carried out in the countries that this literature review 
examines.  But interesting information can be drawn from a survey performed 
by the Australian Vice-Chancellors‘ Committee (AVCC).263  This survey was 
drafted as a submission to the public consultation undertaken by the Australian 
Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC), which carried out the most 
comprehensive study to date on copyright and contracts.264  
The AVCC provided a number of examples of online licences, many of 
them coming from overseas (mostly the U.S.), and imposing several restrictions 
to users.  The Committee reports that 
[m]ost contracts give universities and their staff and students 
rights which are in many respects broader than those allowed for 
by the exceptions — as you would expect given the subscription 
or licence fees that are paid by universities.  However, in most 
cases there will also be provisions which exclude or restrict uses 
and activities that would be allowed by copyright exceptions 
 They also provided examples of some worrisome restrictions: 
                                                                                                                   
 260 See ANALYSIS OF 100 CONTRACTS OFFERED TO THE BRITISH LIBRARY, http://www.bl.uk/ip/ 
pdf/ipmatrix.pdf. 
 261 See the conclusion of this study on http://www.bl.uk?. 
 262 See Response from the British Library to the Green Paper on the Infosoc Directive of 2008, 
at http://www.bl.uk/ip/pdf/greenpaper.pdf. 
 263 The AVCC is an organization regrouping Australian universities.  See http://www.universiti 
esaustralia.edu.au/. 
 264 Available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Copyright_CopyrightLawRevi 
ewCommittee_CLRCReports_CopyrightandContract_CopyrightandContract. 
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— restrictions on the ability of a university to copy, download or 
otherwise incorporate excerpts from the relevant copyright work 
into hard copy or electronic coursepacks,  
— restrictions on the creation of an electronic reserve within a 
university by the copying or downloading of extracts from 
licensed copyright material.  Such reserves may carry significant 
advantages in terms of convenience of search and access for 
students, and management of resources by universities. 
— not allowing users who have access to licensed copyright 
material to print or download that material to the full extent that 
they would otherwise be allowed to in the exercise of their fair 
dealing rights 
— restricting the extent to which non-authorised users can be 
granted access to material or allowed to make copies from that 
material.  Often the definition of authorised users will be limited 
to enrolled students and staff of the relevant university or even 
faculty.  Even where members of the public are entitled to access 
material, there will often be requirements that this is done on the 
premises of the licensed subscriber 
— restrictions on copying or communication for the purpose of 
inter-library loans and on copying done on behalf of other 
universities265 
Also, the Australian National Library, in the context of the same public 
consultation of the CLRC, carried out a similar study on electronic licences.  On 
218 titles of publications accessed from their reading room, they found: 
 
— 8 titles (3 %) where downloading was not permitted; one 
where readers were not permitted to remove downloaded data 
from the library; and 82 (37%, mostly the Informit range of 
databases) where downloading was limited to ―one copy of search 
output‖;  
— 11 titles (5%) that did not enable emailing of extracts; with 
some of these (the Pioneer Indexes), this is probably for 
technological reasons, but it is interesting to note here products 
such as the New Grove dictionary of music and musicians and 
Yearbook Australia;  
                                                                                                                   
 265 See the complete study at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Clrhome.nsf/Page/F5EDCD 
258D62B255CA256B3B007D8616.  
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— 6 titles where printing is not permitted, two which allow a 
―single copy only,‖ and three others where printing is permitted 
―for personal or internal use of the organisation‖ or ―only 1% of 
database material,‖ total 11 (5%);  
— 26 titles (11%) (principally newspapers received as part of the 
Electric Library subscription) where interlibrary loan was not 
permitted; and  
— 7 titles (3%) where reference staff were not permitted to use 
short extracts in answering email enquiries.266 
Also, the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and 
Tax Law participated in the debate on access to scientific information by the 
academic community.  They submitted their conclusion to the EU Commission 
as a comment on the Green Paper on ―Copyright in the Knowledge 
Economy.‖267  They propose to re-draft Article 5 of the Infosoc Directive268 in 
a way to favour on the one hand users and right holders, and, on the other 
hand, the community of researchers, by distinguishing copyright exceptions on 
the basis of the category of user.  In short, to address the scarce possibility of 
dissemination of scientific works, they propose a two-tier approach within 
copyright law, with exceptions and rules specifically designed for scientific 
research.  
The Max Planck Institute, in its conclusion, makes a number of 
recommendations: (a) copyright exceptions should be based on the purpose of 
the use of the protected material; (b) there should be no restrictions for non-
commercial uses; (c) the compensation system for right holders should be 
streamlined; (d) the exceptions should be mandatory; and (e) circumvention of 
copyright limits by contract or by technical locks should be sanctioned.269 
Although the theoretical research and the examples of empirical evidence 
provided above do not have the value of a comprehensive study on the sector 
of the institutions benefitting from copyright limits, useful indications can be 
drawn from the problems that might be encountered by libraries dealing with 
electronic licensing.  Moreover, the research examined suggests interesting 
questions.  Although libraries and research institutions are professional users in 
the sense that they have the means to be correctly informed of their statutory 
rights and they have the bargaining power to negotiate their contracts at arms-
                                                                                                                   
 266 Available at http://www.nla.gov.au/policy/clrcccip.html. 
 267 European Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, COM (2008) 466/3 
Final (July 16, 2008). 
 268 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19. 
 269 Comments of Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 
(2009), on the EC Green Paper: Copyright in the Knowledge Economy 2008, at 2.4.1. 
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length, they seem to be confronted by the copyright industry with standard 
form contracts, whose terms and conditions they have to accept.  The reason 
why this happens is not clear from the above submissions.  The licensing 
practices of the copyright industry vis-à-vis institutions benefitting from 
copyright exceptions, therefore, deserve a separate study in order to clarify this 
matter. 
3.  Commercial Users.  Not all commercial users benefit from copyright 
exceptions.  All of them, though, benefit from copyright limits and exclusions 
(for example, first sale, duration, idea-expression dichotomy).  Examples of 
commercial users of protected copyright works are: broadcasting/webcasting 
institutions (TV and radio); businesses related to leisure activities (e.g., athletic 
clubs, dance classes, hotels or motels, eating and drinking establishments, night 
clubs, etc.), sound and audiovisual producers; and music services.  
While the latter two categories interact directly with the rights holder for the 
licence of one (e.g., a song, a footage, or a picture) or more (up to millions of 
music tracks) copyright works, and therefore are able to negotiate at arms-
length their terms and conditions, broadcasting organizations and leisure 
businesses pay blanket licenses to collecting societies. The licences vary 
according to the use the business makes of the copyrighted material, the size of 
the business and other factors.270  Their general terms and conditions, and the 
amount of the remuneration, are negotiated by the associations representing 
each category.  There is no margin for individual negotiation, especially in 
countries in which the system of collecting societies is centralised.271  However, 
in general, commercial users seem to have the chance, directly or indirectly, to 
negotiate the usage restrictions of the copyright works for which they purchase 
a licence. 
* * * 
The above review on the commercialization of copyrighted works suggests 
that standard form contracts prevail in the commercialization of information 
goods, although no empirical research assessed the exact share of the adoption 
of such contracts by the different industries (software, music, literary works, 
etc).  Individual users, not surprisingly, seem to be more affected than corporate 
bodies by overly restrictive terms and conditions.  But the real impact of the 
latter on users‘ entitlements stemming from copyright law and principles has 
not yet been systematically assessed.  Also interesting is the position of public 
libraries and educational institutions, which in the studies reported above 
                                                                                                                   
 270 See, e.g., RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: HOW TO LICENSE AND CLEAR COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIALS ONLINE AND OFF 123 (3d ed. 2007). 
 271 M. Ricolfi, Presentation at the Turin iLaw conference: Collective Rights Management in a 
Digital Environment (May 25, 2005).  
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lament licensing terms inconsistent with copyright law, but none of them report 
attempts to directly negotiate different terms with the copyright industry. 
E.  DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LIMITS 
Freedom of contract is an established principle both in the EU and the U.S.  
In Europe, some argue it is indirectly protected by fundamental human 
rights.272  In the U.S., contracts enjoy rather extensive protection from 
constitutional principles.  For example, Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution 
forbids the states to pass legislation to impair the obligation of contracts 
without the consent of the Congress.273  Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been interpreted by case law as protecting the freedom of contract.274 
Both in the EU and the U.S., most contract norms are default rules, which 
can be overridden by a different agreement between the parties.275  In general, 
the interpretation of contract terms by courts is not literal, but is based on the 
presumed will of the parties, in view of the principle of good faith and of 
business practices.276  The fairness of the contract, in short, is not investigated 
by courts of law.  They do, however, inquire into the freedom of the will.  In 
fact, common reasons to rescind a contract in both the U.S. and the EU include 
(a) mistake, (b) fraud, and (c) duress.277  
We need to recall, however, that the above standard contract rules were 
conceived in the Nineteenth century, where most transactions were carried out 
at arms-length, by parties with equal bargaining power.  This scenario radically 
changed with the Industrial Revolution and mass production.  Nowadays, it is 
common practice to offer products to the public accompanied by standard 
form contracts.  In these contracts, the seller sets the conditions of the 
agreement and proposes them to the purchaser for acceptance, on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.  
In order to protect consumers, as the weaker party to this bargain, 
legislatures issued a number of statutory limits to contracts.278  For example, 
unlike arms-length contracts, in relation to standard-form contracts, courts can 
                                                                                                                   
 272 As, for example, Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights.  
See Guibault, supra note 5, at 115. 
 273 Id. at 116. 
 274 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1879). 
 275 Guibault, supra note 5, at 116. 
 276 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 115464 (Fr.), translated at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste. 
phtml?lang=uk&c=22; Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBLI] 157, as amended, § 157, Title 3 (F.R.G.). 
 277 Guibault, L. (2002), Copyright Limitations and Contracts – An Analysis of the Contractual 
Overridability of Limitations on Copyright (Kluwer Law International 2002), at 117. 
 278 Id. at 118–19. 
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inquire into the fairness of the terms and conditions.279  Moreover, contract law 
doctrines such as unconscionability and good faith are also used for consumer 
protection. 
1.  Unconscionability and Good Faith.  In the U.S., contracts can be limited by 
the doctrine of unconscionability, stipulated by section 2-302 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) and by section 111 of the UNIFORM COMPUTER 
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA).  Under this doctrine, a clause is 
not enforceable if there is a flaw in the bargaining process or if a term is 
unfair.280  In general, this doctrine is more likely to be applied in defence of 
private consumers, rather than corporate bodies or cultural institutions.  The 
latter, in fact, can hardly demonstrate that a term is ―beyond reasonable 
expectations of an ordinary person or it causes an unfair surprise.‖281  However, 
according to some, this doctrine can fail to assist copyright works users.  A term 
contradicting copyright law would not be automatically declared 
unconscionable.  In practice, it is argued that every case would be judged by 
assessing what the reasonable expectations of the purchaser were in view of all 
the facts and circumstances.282  Others add that this doctrine is of limited use 
for consumers of copyright works, because in order to pass the 
unconscionability test a contract has to be clearly one-sided in favour of the 
owner, and contracts overriding copyright limits would not necessarily appear 
one-sided to courts.283 
In Europe, the principle of good faith corresponds to the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  In general, the good faith principle sets forth a number of 
rules of correctness to follow before and during the transaction.  Civil Law 
countries all implement a principle of good faith in contract law, although the 
details of each national provision are different.284  Also, some common law 
countries reserve to the principle of good faith specific legal coverage.  In the 
U.K., the Unfair Terms Regulation 1999 stipulates that a contract term is 
unenforceable if ―contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
                                                                                                                   
 279 See Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2010); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 91981); U.C.I.T.A. § 111 (2000).  See also 
Guibault, supra note 5, at 151. 
 280 Guibault, supra note 5, at 261. 
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R3-CV, 2000 WL 1421561 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2000).  
 282 O‘ Rourke, supra note 191, at 70. 
 283 De Werra, supra note 187, at 286. 
 284 The doctrine of good faith is different from country to country.  See Alberto M. Musy, The 
Good Faith Principle in Contract Law and the Pre-contractual Duty to Disclose: Comparative Analysis of New 
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significant imbalance in the parties.‖285  While another related act, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, does not apply to intellectual property matters and is 
therefore of no help,286 some other principles could be helpful.  First of all, if a 
clause of a contract contains a particularly onerous or unusual condition, the 
party seeking to enforce that condition has to show that it had been brought 
fairly and reasonably to the attention of the other party; otherwise, the term 
does not apply.287  Secondly, the doctrine of undue influence could also be 
helpful.  This doctrine applies when a person in a position of dominance uses 
that position to obtain an unfair advantage for him or herself, and so influences 
the person relying on his authority or aid.  It must be shown that there was a 
relationship where one party has a dominating influence over the other and the 
influence was used to bring about a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.  So 
far, there is no decision applying this doctrine in relation to users‘ contracts, but 
as we have seen, some case law exists in respect of creators‘ contracts288 (see 
paper 2).  
Thirdly, the doctrine of restraint of trade could also be used in a few cases.  
Contracts should not restrict the right of a person to practice their trade.  In 
Schroeder Music Publishing v. Macaulay,289 the court held that a contract with an 
extended term with no obligation on the publisher to exploit the works of the 
creator was in restraint of trade.  The effect of these two doctrines is to render 
the contract, or else the clause, unenforceable.  However, these doctrines have 
only been applied in the most egregious cases and only in relation to creators‘ 
contracts so that it is not immediately obvious that those doctrines would be as 
applicable in the field of users‘ contracts.  Indeed, few contracts will be entered 
into under undue influence—unless one could say that a party having a 
dominant position is akin to exercising undue influence.  However, some user 
contracts may restrain the ability of the person to practice their trade.  One can 
think of the case of a journalist or reviewer who relies on the criticism or review 
or news reporting exceptions for their trade.  Their trade would be restricted if 
a contract were to override these exceptions.  However, there is no literature on 
this case law which relates to its application of users‘ contracts. 
                                                                                                                   
 285 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/2053, § 5(1) (U.K.) 
(implementing Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L. 95) 29 (EC)). 
 286 See Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50 § 1–1(c) (Eng.).  The UCTA can be applied to 
terms in IP contracts, but it does not apply to the terms that create or transfer a right or interest 
in intellectual property, or relate to the termination of any such right or interest, which are the 
relevant terms in most users‘ contracts. 
 287 Interfoto Picture Library v. Stiletto Visual Programmes [1989] Q.B. 433.  
 288 O‘Sullivan v. Mgmt. Agency Music Ltd., [1985] QB 428; Elton John v. James, [1991] FSR 
397. 
 289 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 [1974] 3 All ER 616 (H.L.). 
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Finally, common law equity plays a remedial role in contract law, which can 
also usefully be applied to user contracts.  As far as we know, there is no case 
law specifically relating to users‘ contracts. 
Another European doctrine impacting contracts is the contra proferentem 
rule.290  According to this norm, in case of doubt, a clause of a contract is 
interpreted by courts in the sense less advantageous for the party that sets the 
clause.  The rationale of this provision is underpinned by the aim to protect the 
weakest party of a contract.291 
No case law has applied the principle of good faith or the contra proferentem 
rule to the interplay between contract and copyright limits.  But the literature on 
this point highlights the fact that the potential outcome of practical case law is 
difficult to foresee.  Even in countries fully applying the above principles to 
contracts, courts could take different stances on the matter.  Guibault suggests 
that, for example, a contract would probably prevail on copyright exceptions in 
France, but it could have some of its clauses rejected as unfair in the 
Netherlands and Germany.292  
Contract law principles, in conclusion, are of uncertain help for the case of 
users of copyrighted works restrained in their access and use of creative works 
from overreaching terms and conditions.  However, as far as the U.K. is 
concerned, the lack of case law and doctrinal analysis on the issue probably 
shows another gap in the literature.  A doctrinal study on the application of 
general English contract law to copyright may be considered useful. 
2.  Limits to Contracts Set by Copyright Law: The Doctrine of Preemption.  As 
observed in Section A, in the U.S., copyright limits can, in principle, be 
overridden by contract.  However, the interplay between contract law and 
copyright law is complicated in the U.S. by the federal structure of the country.  
Contract law is a matter for state legislation and copyright law falls under the 
jurisdiction of federal law.  The latter, under certain circumstances, can preempt 
the former.   This is the essence of the preemption doctrine. 
 Section 301(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act prevents states from granting 
protection equivalent to copyright.293  Two questions need to be answered 
affirmatively for a state law to be preempted by federal law.  The first is whether 
the subject matter protected by the state law in question is eligible for copyright 
protection under sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act (i.e., the state law 
must deal with a fixed work of authorship that comes within copyright subject 
                                                                                                                   
 290 This principle has been codified in UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, art. 4(6) (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/ 
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matter).  The second question is whether the rights granted by state law are 
equivalent to the exclusive rights provided under section 106 of the Copyright 
Act.294 
This second part of the test is called the ―extra element test.‖295  According 
to the ―extra element test‖ a right provided by state law is equivalent to 
copyright, and therefore pre-empted by federal law, if it is infringed by the mere 
act of reproduction, adaptation, performance, distribution, or display of the 
work.296  The legislative history of section 301 is muddled to the point that it is 
impossible to know with certainty whether misappropriation and contract laws 
are preempted.297  This has caused some difficulties to courts when having to 
apply Section 301.  
Preemption is similar to French unfair competition law.  The latter provides 
that a fact or act distinct from infringement is necessary for the action against 
parasitism to succeed.  Similarly, in the U.S., if the complained act is identical to 
copyright infringement, no misappropriation claim is possible; like in France, 
there must be an additional or different element.  In other words, it is not 
possible to protect an uncopyrightable work with the misappropriation doctrine 
unless the allegedly unlawful behaviour involves an extra element other than 
mere copying.   
A seminal case involving the tension between copyright limits and contract 
is ProCD.298  ProCD commercialised a telephone directory on CD-ROM, 
incorporated in a database managed by proprietary software.  The use of the 
software and of the telephone directory was limited by usage restrictions 
included in a licence agreement, which appeared on the computer screen at 
every access to the product.  Zeidenberg bought the CD, copied the directory, 
and published it on his website.  ProCD claimed both copyright infringement 
and breach of contract.  The first claim was not upheld (in relation to the 
directory listing) for lack of originality.  The second claim, on the contrary, was 
                                                                                                                   
 294 See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory 
Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 509, 548–49; Shane M. McGee, Casenote, Cooling Off 
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 296 17 U.S.C. § 106; Computer Assoc. Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Guibault, supra note 5, at 231. 
 297 For an explanation regarding misappropriation, see Jane C. Ginsburg, No ―Sweat‖? Copyright 
and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 
(1992).  For an explanation regarding contracts, see Guibault, supra note 5, at 232. 
 298 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  See also Michael J. Madison, Legal-
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upheld, although Zeidenberg claimed that he did not have the possibility of 
reading the terms of the licence.299  
In the ProCD case, Judge Easterbrook rejected the preemption of the licence 
under section 301.  He reasoned that a simple two-party contract is not 
―equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright‖ 
and therefore may be enforced.300  The case has had wide coverage from 
copyright scholars, arguing either in favour or against Easterbrook‘s 
construct.301  Moreover, e-commerce U.S. legislation (the UCITA) following the 
ProCD case was underpinned by the same reasoning that inspired Judge 
Easterbrook.302  The drafters of the UCITA specified that the preemption 
doctrine would ―seldom apply to contracts.‖  In sum, the reasoning in both case 
law and legislation was essentially the following: federal copyright law cannot 
normally preempt state contract law because contracts are simply not equivalent 
to copyright.303  This reasoning was resumed in subsequent case law.304  
A previous ruling to ProCD, however, had expressed the opposite view.  In 
the Vault case,305 Vault manufactured a diskette with a copy protection device.  
Quaid circumvented the copy protection device to be able to copy the content 
of the diskette.  He also studied the protection system, so when Vault upgraded 
his product, Quaid was ready with a new work-around.  The court in Vault 
upheld the prevalence of federal copyright law over state law.  Under the law of 
the state in question (the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act) the 
unauthorised reproduction of protected material is not permitted.306  The 
federal Copyright Act, on the contrary, allows archival copies and copies which 
                                                                                                                   
 299 For a detailed analysis of ProCD and its impact on the interplay between copyright and 
contract, see De Werra, supra note 187, at 255–63. 
 300 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. 
 301 See, e.g., Guibault, supra note 5; Elkin-Koren, supra note 161; De Werra, supra note 187, at 
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 302 The same aim that inspired the outcome of ProCD, that is, not stifling online commerce, 
inspired also the U.S. government, which added Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code, 
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 304 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the 
federal Copyright Act did not preempt the prohibition of reverse engineering embodied in 
Bowers‘ shrink-wrap license). 
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are an essential step in the utilization of a computer program.307  Moreover, in 
Vault, it was argued that the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act 
grants unlimited protection to copyright material, while the federal Copyright 
Act grants a protection which has limits in terms of duration and originality.  In 
conclusion, although the court did not expressly mention the preemption 
doctrine, Vault‘s claims were rejected.308 
In Bowers, which followed the ProCD ruling, Justice Ryk dissented, recalling 
the reasoning in Vault.309  He argued that only when a contract is negotiated at 
arms length is the extra element fulfilled and the preemption barred.310  
According to him, Bowers is different from ProCD because Baystate needed to 
reproduce part of the program to benefit from the fair use exemption.311  State 
law prohibiting reverse engineering contrasts with federal law allowing it, and 
therefore the latter should preempt the former.312  In conclusion, while cases 
like Vault may suggest that contracts cannot override copyright limits, cases like 
ProCD, which is still cited in the subsequent case law, indicate the opposite. 
It is unclear whether contracts of adhesion, which provide rights holders 
with even more protection than negotiated contracts, are preempted under 
section 301 of the Copyright Act.313  In line with the reasoning of Justice Ryk, 
who dissented in Bowers,314 some argue that the preemption doctrine applies 
specifically to standard form contracts, and does not apply to arms-length 
contracts, because only the former offers a protection to rights holders that is 
equivalent to statute.  In short, they think that the private ordering provided by 
standard-form contracts equates with copyright law, and therefore is preempted 
by federal law according to the second step of the preemption test.315  In sum, 
courts seem to be divided on this issue, which makes contract law rather 
unreliable as a tool to override copyright limits.316  
However, the preemption doctrine is not limited to the interface between 
state law and federal copyright law.  Even if a state cause of action based on 
misappropriation or contract survives section 301 preemption, it can still be 
preempted on the basis of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.317  Under 
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this clause, a cause of action may be preempted if its enforcement would ―stand 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.‖318  In the Feist case, the last precedent on point, the Supreme Court 
seemed adamant that certain unfair competition claims survive to protect 
―sweat of the brow‖ efforts.319  However, it is unclear on which conditions such 
claims would survive preemption.320  In sum, absent a ruling of the Supreme 
Court on this issue, the law on this matter is uncertain.  The constitutional 
preemption will be discussed below, in the subsection dedicated to 
constitutional limits to contract. 
In Europe, the relationship between community law and national law is 
clearer.  EU law prevails on national law.321  Thus, national legislation 
overriding imperative copyright exceptions set by EU law322 is not applicable, 
and clauses protected by such national law should be declared null and void.  
Cases such as ProCD, therefore, would be resolved by competition law 
legislation or the legislation protecting the sui generis right of database 
producers.323  Regrettably, no such cases have been decided by European 
courts.  
A threatened litigation between the National Portrait Gallery of London 
(NPG) and Derrik Coetzee (a Wikipedia administrator) has the potential to 
shed some light on the matter.  The NPG threatened to sue Coetzee for 
database right violation, copyright violation, circumvention of TPMs, and 
breach of contract (a browse-wrap licence) because he copied more than 3,000 
images from the NPG website and published them on Wikipedia.324  The 
images are photographs of paintings that are no longer covered by copyright 
protection. 
If U.K. law applies, and if the photographs are found unprotected by 
copyright, a ruling could finally clarify (a) whether browse-wrap licences are 
                                                                                                                   
 318 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).  
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enforceable, and (b) whether a contractual clause that forbids the reproduction 
of a public domain work is unlawful because it overrides copyright limits.325 
3.  The Doctrines of Misuse and Abuse of Rights.  Stemming from U.S. intellectual 
property principles, the doctrine of misuse of copyright is another instrument 
that can be used to limit contractual clauses attempting to expand copyright 
protection.  Under copyright misuse doctrine, practices that preclude others 
from developing and creating new works under pretext of copyright protection 
are abusive.326  Copyright misuse does not give the victim of misuse a right—
and therefore it does not give her standing in a legal action—but only a defence 
against copyright infringement.327  During the period the copyright is misused, 
the exclusive rights of the owner are suspended, thus excusing the acts of 
infringement.328  Mostly, this doctrine is used in connection with antitrust 
claims, or it is considered together with claims of an economic nature.329  It is, 
therefore, more likely to be employed between commercial entities than in 
favour of a private consumer.  
The doctrine of misuse of intellectual property rights is not stipulated by 
statutes.  It was first articulated in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.330 and then 
in Lasercomb v. Reynolds.331  In the latter, it was declared that ―[t]he question is 
not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust 
law . . . but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the 
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.‖332  In other words, when 
copyright is used in a way to run afoul of the public policy rationale under 
which copyright is protected, there is a copyright misuse. 
In most continental countries in Europe, the doctrine of abuse of right 
corresponds to the American doctrine of misuse. Abuse of right can be caused 
by: (a) fault, when a person does not adopt a reasonable and prudent behaviour; 
(b) intention to harm; and (c) exercise of the right for a different purpose from 
that for which it was conferred.333  According to Guibault, this last occurrence 
shares with its American counterpart the underpinning on which it is based: the 
protection of public policy.  It is in the interest of the community that the rights 
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granted by law are used coherently with the purpose for which they were 
conceded.334 
Guibault argues that, given the public interest function of copyright, clauses 
violating statutory copyright law or fundamental copyright exceptions, like the 
exception for parody, would be abusive under the misuse doctrine.335  However, 
clauses that do not impede innovation and creation, as, for example, the 
exception for copying from libraries and similar institutions, would not be 
considered a misuse.  A fortiori, the same would apply for copyright exceptions 
justified by the elimination of transaction costs.336  Guibault concludes that, in 
practice, in the U.S., the copyright misuse doctrine is rarely applied to protect 
copyright users.  Moreover, in Europe, it would not be possible to resort to the 
doctrine of abuse of right in circumstances that in the U.S. would be protected 
by the misuse doctrine.  This makes these doctrines of limited overall utility.337 
A few commentators, reflecting on the copyright misuse doctrine, have 
argued in favour of its application to cases of contracts overriding copyright 
limits (namely fair use).338  Some have also called for a modification of copyright 
statutes to introduce a formal copyright misuse doctrine, which could be used 
against overreaching contracts.339  Thomas Bell went a step further by wording 
a new prospective article in the U.S. U.C.C. that codifies the doctrine of 
copyright misuse in the sense of outlawing contracts that limit non-infringing 
uses.340  Importantly, in his case law review on the copyright misuse doctrine, he 
admits that current case law (wrongly, in his opinion) applies the misuse 
doctrine only in cases of copyright infringement, and not against contracts.341 
In conclusion, on the one hand, the preemption doctrine, which is 
characteristic of the U.S. system, is unreliable as a tool to defend users of 
copyrighted works against overreaching contracts.  On the other hand, while 
commentators on the misuse doctrine call for its modification in order to use it 
against terms and conditions overriding copyright limits (or at least the most 
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fundamental among them), they also admit that current statutes and case law do 
not suggest the possibility of using the doctrine in this manner. 
4.  Other Limits to Contracts: Public Policy.  Public policy considerations can also 
limit freedom of contract both in the U.S. and in the EU.  In Europe, private 
agreements are due to respect public policy and good morals,342 while in the 
U.S., contracts cannot run afoul of public policy.343  According to a 
classification operated by Guibault, public policy considerations can be divided 
into: (a) economic public policy and (b) protective public policy.  The first 
produces norms of competition law (rules of antitrust in the U.S., and rules of 
fair competition in the EU); the second creates norms of consumer protection. 
In relation to competition law, Lucie Guibault analysed Article 81 (ex Art. 
85 and 86) of the EC Treaty and title 15 sections 1–7 of the U.S. Sherman Act, 
which respectively address the abuse of the dominant position in the market 
and the acquisition or maintenance of monopolistic positions.  In both cases, 
the condition for either of the two violations to exist is to have acted ―with 
improper means.‖  
The survey of case law she carried out demonstrates that, in practice, it is 
very difficult to prove the unlawful behaviour.344  Competition law therefore 
can be of limited utility where a contract overrides one or more copyright limits.  
Moreover, it is more likely to be used in relation to functional works (like 
patents) than copyright, because of the support to innovation that underscores 
competition law and antitrust policies.345  However, the music and film industry 
probably represents an exception where the concentration of market power in 
the hands of a few companies can often raise competition issues.346 
In the U.S., the essential facilities doctrine has been examined as a potential 
instrument to limit overreaching contracts.  The doctrine of the essential 
facilities requires:  (a) the possession of an essential facility by a monopolist, (b) 
the impossibility for the competitor to access that facility, (c) the denial of a 
licence by the owner, and (d) the viability of practical access to the facility.  
In the famous antitrust case against Microsoft,347 which was considered by 
copyright literature as a perfect opportunity for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine,348 this doctrine was not applied. In truth, Microsoft was 
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obliged to disclose features of its products to its competitors, but only under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act (abuse of dominant position).  This clearly shows 
the difficulty of applying such doctrine to the interplay between copyright and 
contracts.  
De Werra argues that, although useful to regulate abusive behaviours based 
on copyright protection, antitrust law alone cannot be relied upon to protect the 
interests of copyright users.  Public policy as a limit to contracts overriding 
copyright limits can be difficult to apply.  He warns that the legislation 
embodying public policy, which cannot be overridden by private agreement, has 
to be ―crystal clear‖; this is not necessarily easy in the copyright field, where 
fundamental concepts like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy are 
defined by courts and not by law.349  Copyright law and antitrust law, he 
concludes, should both be used to stem overreaching behaviours of those 
implementing technical protection measures and contracts.350 
5.  Consumer Protection.  In the EU, a limit to national contract law resides in 
national and supra-national consumer protection legislation.  The EU Directives 
providing for consumer contractual rights are:   
 
● Directive on Contracts Negotiated Away from Business 
Premises;351   
● Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Unfair 
Terms Directive);352  
● Directive on the protection of consumers in respect of 
Distance Contracts (Distance Contracts Directive);353  
● Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees;354 
● Directive on Electronic Commerce (E-commerce Directive).355 
They generally set duties of correct behaviour for the seller of products, 
either commercialised online or through traditional means.  A few of their 
provisions may apply also to consumers of copyright works. 
According to Article 4 of the Distance Contracts Directive, for example, 
rights holders should disclose to the purchaser ―the main characteristics of 
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goods and services.‖  When implementing TPMs on copyright works, therefore, 
the owner has the duty to inform the end-user before hand.356  Moreover, for 
those digital copyright works that are considered goods—the statutes seem to 
suggest that on-demand downloadable works are services—the same directive 
stipulates, in Article 6(1), a right of withdrawal from the purchase, without 
penalty or justification.  However, Article 6(3) excludes from its scope 
audio/video recordings and computer software.  
The Unfair Terms Directive of 1993 outlaws contracts contrary to good 
faith, and lists a number of unfair clauses as examples.  However, the 
overridability of copyright exceptions is not mentioned in the list, and it is 
therefore unclear whether a similar clause would be considered contrary to 
good faith by courts.357  
It is worth noting that the above-mentioned directives on e-commerce and 
unfair terms are in the process of being modified by the Consumer Rights 
Directive, which was launched in 2008.358  The proposal, among other things, 
replaces the indicative list of unfair terms with a black list of mandatory unfair 
terms and a grey list of presumed unfair terms. Neither of them, though, state 
that terms contrary to statutory law are unfair.359   
In the U.K., consumer protection is covered by specific legislation, which 
also implements the above EU directives: 
● Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
● Sale of Goods Act 1979 
● Consumer Protection Act 1987  
● Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
● Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 
● Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002 
The Unfair Terms Regulation of 1999 stipulates that a contract term is 
unenforceable if, ―contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties.‖360  This provision of consumer law has 
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been identified by copyright doctrine as the only one applicable to copyright 
users.361  
In the U.S., section 2-302 of the U.C.C. (later section 111 of the UCITA) 
serves a comparable function by applying the unconscionability doctrine to 
consumer protection.  As noted in the previous section, U.S. unconscionability 
doctrine seems to be more restrictive than the European good faith doctrine, 
and both appear to have a limited utility for the protection of consumers of 
copyrighted material.362  Consumer protection, therefore, does not seem to add 
any particular protection to users of copyright works, beyond the already 
examined contract law doctrines.  Specific legislation on consumers is rarely 
applicable to consumers of copyrighted works.  In fact, copyright literature 
from both the EU and the U.S. criticises consumer legislation for not taking 
into account the peculiarity of the consumers of copyright information.363  
6. Constitutional Limits to Contracts.  Lucie Guibault has examined 
Constitutional principles and human rights as applicable to private relationships, 
and, therefore, liable to have an impact on copyright user protection against 
abusive contract terms.364  Preliminarily, she addresses the vertical or horizontal 
application of constitutional principles.  
Constitutional principles are traditionally invoked to protect citizens against 
the State (vertical action), but more recently, they have been used to protect 
citizens against other citizens (horizontal action).  The horizontal action can be 
direct, as when a citizen brings to court another citizen for the breach of a 
constitutional principle, or indirect, as when a citizen acts against the State to 
obtain the application of a constitutional principle within a private litigation.  
In Europe, the direct horizontal application of the constitutional principles 
is not obvious; the indirect action is, however, mostly recognised.365  According 
to Guibault, this is confirmed by European literature and by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.366  
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In the U.S., the Bill of Rights only protects citizens against the State.  As a 
general principle, the U.S. Government tends not to intrude into private 
relationships.  Therefore, the responsibility of the State in a case of violation of 
constitutional principles by a private citizen needs to be ascertained case-by-
case.367  However, consideration of the issue of the direct application of the 
Constitution between citizens needs to take into account the possibility that a 
person can waive her constitutional rights.  In Europe, this is not possible.  
Only contractual arrangements that do not affect the essential content of 
constitutional rights are allowed.  In the U.S., on the contrary, the waiver of 
constitutional principles is allowed in order to enable self-governance.  But the 
courts in the case of waiver of fundamental rights subject the validity of the 
assent to a strict scrutiny.368 
In the U.S., constitutional principles of copyright—including the 
fundamental justification for copyright protection and freedom of expression 
(underpinning some instances of fair use)—can be used to limit contracts on 
the basis of Supremacy Clause preemption.  
Patterson and Lindberg, for example, maintain that copyright was invented 
principally to enhance the learning process of the community at large.369  
Copyright does so by promoting the circulation of culture and the transmission 
of knowledge.  
Neil Netanel claims that copyright serves as a direct vehicle of democracy by 
boosting exchange of ideas and communication of thoughts.370  All these 
authors maintain that, if copyright law were applied by courts in a way to 
uphold and guarantee these fundamental copyright underpinnings, the balance 
between owners and users would be achieved.371  
Guibault argues on this basis that she would expect a contract clause 
overturning fundamental copyright principles, grounded on freedom of 
expression and the diffusion of culture, to be held null and void.372  But the real 
potential and scope of the constitutional preemption is unclear, and the 
outcome of case law addressing the above issues would be uncertain both in 
Europe and in the U.S.373  By examining case law on freedom of expression, 
Guibault concludes that the courts decide cases on the basis of whether the 
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restriction imposed by the owner is content-based or content neutral.374  
Content-based restrictions are very difficult to enforce, because they are more 
obviously in breach of freedom of expression.  Content-neutral clauses, on the 
contrary, are upheld if they satisfy a ―substantial governmental interest.‖375 
Finally, some commentators argue that, just like federal preemption, 
constitutional preemption applies only to standard-form contracts.376  However, 
there is no case law confirming such an interpretation.  In Goldstein v. California, 
the Supreme Court held that states cannot use legislation ―to protect that which 
Congress intended to be free and free that which Congress had protected.‖377  
The case at hand, though, refers to state legislation directly, and not to a 
contract.378 
The above suggests that limiting contracts to protect the interests of 
copyright users can hardly be done effectively elsewhere than in copyright 
legislation.379  The InfoSoc Directive may be modified as a result of 
consultations following the Green Paper on the ―Copyright in the Knowledge 
Economy‖380 and the moment is timely to introduce some provisions that 
would guarantee such result.  Some of the questions in the Green Paper 
include: should there be encouragement or guidelines for contractual 
arrangements between rights holders and users for the implementation of 
copyright exceptions and should some limits be made imperative? 
Many academics and institutions have responded by suggesting the 
introduction of new provisions protecting at least fundamental copyright limits 
                                                                                                                   
 374 See Netanel, supra note 177 (arguing that in the case of content-based restrictions, copyright 
legislation (including both exclusive rights and exceptions) impacts works in which the content is 
the reason for the claiming of rights).  This normally occurs in cases where parody or criticism is 
called into play.  In this case, Netanel argues, the scrutiny must be strict in the light of freedom of 
expression.  This means that freedom of expression also can be identified beyond the boundaries 
of copyright limits.  In the case of content-neutral restrictions, copyright entitlements are claimed 
irrespective of the content of the work.  One example could be the exception for private copying.  
In the case of content-neutral claims, Netanel claims it is not necessarily ―a strict scrutiny‖ on the 
compliance with freedom of expression.  This means that, in this second case, copyright 
exceptions have to be interpreted narrowly; e.g., that construction should not go beyond their 
boundaries.  Strowel and Tulkens add that all issues regarding access are content-neutral, and 
therefore only require intermediate scrutiny.  This means that the built-in safety valves of 
copyright provide enough scrutiny for freedom of expression.  See Strowel & Tulkens, supra note 
116. 
 375 Guibault, supra note 5, at 296. 
 376 See, e.g., supra note 315, at 271. 
 377 De Werra, supra note 187, at 271–72 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 
(1973)). 
 378 Id. at 272. 
 379 Derclaye, supra note 54, at 167–211. 
 380 Green Paper, supra note 267. 
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from contracts and TPMs.381  It remains to be seen to what extent the EU 
legislature will listen to the calls from the commentators. 
Hitherto, we have analysed the interplay between contracts and copyright 
exceptions.  However, it is worth noting that electronic licences are typically 
directed towards millions of end-users, who are very difficult to track down and 
to bring to justice in case of infringement.  The difficulty of enforcing electronic 
licences would limit, in practice, the threat posed by contracts to copyright 
limits.  However, the implementation of technological protection measures 
provides unprecedented possibilities for effective self-enforcement. 
VI.  DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM) AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS 
A.  THE DANGERS OF DIGITAL LOCK-UP 
DRM consists of licensing agreements and technological protection 
measures (TPMs), which set access and usage restrictions on information 
works.  DRM reduces dramatically the costs of negotiation between owners and 
users of copyright works, as well as the costs of enforcement of copyright law 
(transaction costs). Often the acronyms DRM and TPM are used 
interchangeably to indicate the latter.  This is because the technological part of 
DRM (i.e., the TPM), by self-enforcing—in other words unilaterally as opposed 
to bilaterally as with contracts—the rules of the contract, raises the most 
significant issues in terms of copyright users‘ protection. 
With the advent of the digital era, where the reproduction of copyrighted 
works is easy and perfect, many legal commentators envisaged scenarios of 
substantial change in copyright legislation.  Most of them foresaw an increase in 
copyright protection, in line with the trend of recent decades.382 Opposite 
positions, forecasting a reduction in copyright protection, are rather isolated.383  
                                                                                                                   
 381 See the Comments to the Green Paper at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_ 
consultations/library?l=/copyright_neighbouring/legislation_copyright&vm=detailed&sb=Title.  
In particular, see the comments from the IViR center in Amsterdam, the MaxPlank Institute in 
Munich, and the British Library. 
 382 Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 567, 606–07 (1997) (stating that the diffusion of shrinkwrap licensing in the 
computer software field will lead to the end of copyright regulations, at least for digital goods, the 
protection of which will become increasingly contract-based). 
 383 Martin Kretschmer, for example, hypothesizes a radical subversion of copyright law within a 
generation.  He argues that the current legislation (American, European and international) is 
counterproductive and ineffective because it hinders the diffusion of culture and information 
where it should enhance it—and indeed repeatedly claims to do so in its declaration of intents.  
The author puts forward his vision: 
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Some commentators salute new technologies such as DRM as the way to fix the 
imperfections of the market (market failures), which are worsened by the digital 
environment.  Therefore, for some commentators the expansion of copyright 
through the protection of DRM represents the way ahead.384  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are other copyright 
commentators who fear that DRM and the protection of DRM are damaging 
users‘ traditional rights.  They argue that this trend is dangerous for the public 
interest, because it dispels traditional allowances for the public to access 
copyrighted works.385  Some of them advocate radical changes to copyright law 
in order to resist this trend.386  For example, self-enforcing tools should be 
provided to the user as they have been provided to the owner.387  Others argue 
that a simple transposition of the traditional copyright principles to the digital 
environment could be sufficient.  This would need to ensure that the same 
balance of rights and exceptions guaranteed by copyright law is re-created in the 
digital world.388  
Against the detractors of DRM, it has been argued that the technology in 
itself is neutral, and the use or misuse of it is the only circumstance liable to 
create problems with copyright law.  The study of Patricia Akester mentioned in 
SECTION 3 has revealed that DRM developers are able to fine-tune the 
technology to meet the needs of the users.389  But they do not fine-tune it, 
                                                                                                                   
Within a generation . . . [c]opyright laws will change, so as to be unrecognisable.  
There will be [a] short burst of exclusivity, encouraging fast exploitation, 
followed by a remuneration right for the [lifetime] of the creator.  Criminal law 
will retreat to the traditional domain of unauthorised or deceptive commercial 
exploitation.  As we reflect, digital copyright at the turn of the millennium will 
have marked the end of an era. 
Kretschmer, supra note 178, at 341. 
 384 Among these is self-declared ―copyright optimist‖ Paul Goldstein.  See Paul Goldstein, 
Summary of Discussion, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 241 (P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz ed., 1996); see also Bell, supra note 191, at 580.  
 385 See, e.g., Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 4.  
 386 See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz, De databankrichtlijn eindelijk aanvaard: een zeer kritisch commentaar 
[The Database Directive is Finally Adopted: a Highly Critical Commentary], 1996(4) COMPUTERRECHT 
131; Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D‘AUTEUR 3 (1994) (arguing that in the digital environment, 
adaptation of old principles is not enough—radical revision of copyright is needed). 
 387 See Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest 
Uses of Technically Protected Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007); Heide, supra note 64. 
 388 See Netanel, supra note 177.  See also Thomas Dreier, Contracting Out of Copyright in the 
Information Society: the Impact on Freedom of Expression, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 385 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 
2005).  
 389 See also Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of 
Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, [2000] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198 (2000). 
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because they are not asked to do so by the owner.  On the contrary, sometimes 
users‘ allowances created by some DRM developers are not utilised.  For 
example, researchers investigating the respect of the exception for disabled 
people (namely, visually impaired people) have found that technical allowances 
implemented on digital products for the benefit of disabled people are 
deactivated upon request of rights holders. They state: 
Microsoft and Adobe, which have implemented the use of TTS 
[text-to-speech synthesizer] in their eBook reading systems, have 
heard from publishers that the audio rights to their eBooks may 
have been sold.  Therefore a feature has been added that allows 
the use of TTS to be turned off.  This means that at the time of 
creation, a decision can be made by the publisher to disable the 
use of TTS for this particular eBook.390 
Technology therefore does not seem to be the main problem.391 Rather, it is 
the use that copyright owners make of the technology on their products that 
raises concerns.  Some suggest that such overreaching behaviour is allowed by 
law, and in particular, by the InfoSoc Directive in Europe and by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the U.S.  This legislation seems to have 
created an expanded copyright protection in the digital environment, allowing 
right holders to control every use and access of copyrighted works.  In sum, 
they argue, a new right has been created for the owner: a ―right of access.‖392 
Also, in Europe, the copyright literature detected in the last decades an 
expansion of the prerogatives of copyright owners, which in practice give birth 
to an enhanced access control on copyrighted works.  They argue that the 
reproduction right393 and the communication right394 as drafted in the InfoSoc 
                                                                                                                   
 390 See George Kerscher & Jim Fruchterman, The Soundproof Book: Exploration of Rights Conflict and 
Access to Commercial eBooks for People with Disabilities (2002), http://www.idpf.org/doc_library/infor 
mationaldocs/soundproof/soundproof.htm; Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital 
Rights Management — Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT — 
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 597 (Becker Eberhard et al. eds., 
2003).  
 391 Bechtold, supra note 390 (stating that DRM is an instrument sufficiently flexible to adapt to 
the new digital environment); Dam, supra note 191 (arguing that DRM is an ideal instrument to 
ensure copyright compliance and greater efficiency in protecting copyright in the digital 
environment); contra, see Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005). 
 392 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 160 (2001).  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
 393 Thomas Heide, Copyright in the EU and U.S.: What ―Access-Right‖?, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y 
U.S. 363 (2001); Dusollier, supra note 222; Westkamp, supra note 179. 
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Directive, broadly interpreted, can grant access-control prerogatives to 
copyright owners.  However, a narrow interpretation of these exclusive rights, 
which in the view of the same literature is the correct one, would outlaw only 
infringing reproduction and communication to the public, and would not 
unduly expand the privilege of the owner.395  Other commentators argue that 
access privileges are guaranteed by the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
InfoSoc Directive,396 and are de facto empowered by TPMs.397  For some, this 
is a natural effect of the transition from the analogue to the digital world,398 
while for others, this transition unduly creates new privileges.399  Also, these 
authors agree that TPMs should not expand the exclusive rights of the owner, 
and they should respect copyright limits.400 
However, concerns of legal commentators picturing an evolution of DRM 
towards technical standards401 that do not take into account the entitlements of 
the user are somewhat contradicted by some recent trends in the music 
industry.  Recently, music service providers are offering their products DRM-
free.  Initially, these DRM-free business models only interested independent 
labels.402  Currently, the major music labels (the first was EMI403) have also 
agreed to license DRM-free products for mass distribution.  Nowadays, several 
music services offer either their whole catalogue in DRM-free version,404 or 
they price-differentiate DRM-free products and DRM-protected ones.405  
This DRM-free feature, however, seems to be limited to inter-operability.  
This means that the above DRM-free products can be played on different 
rendering devices.  But some of them (e.g., iTunes files) can still be copied only 
on a limited number of hardware devices.  These usage restrictions, set in the 
                                                                                                                   
 394 See Dusollier, supra note 182 ; Westkamp, supra note 179. 
 395 Dusollier, supra note 222, at 202; Westkamp, supra note 179, at 1098, 1103; Dusollier, supra 
note 182, at 39; Heide, supra note 393, at 368. 
 396 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, art. 6.  See Kamiel Koelman, A Hard Nut to Crack: The 
Protection of Technological Measures, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 272, 276 (2000). 
 397 Dusollier, supra note 10, at 109. 
 398 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an 
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S. 113 (2003). 
 399 Heide, T. (2001), ‗Copyright in the EU and U.S.: What ‗Access-Right? J. Copyright Soc. USA 
48 at 378–79. 
 400 Ginsburg, supra note 398, at 131; Heide, supra note 394, at 381–82. 
 401 Burk, supra note 391. 
 402 See, e.g., eMusic at http://www.emusic.com, which started off by offering music from 
independent labels. 
 403 See Peter Eckersley, EMI Begins Licensing DRM-Free Music Downloads, DEEPLINKS BLOG, Apr. 
2, 2007, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/04/emi-begins-licensing-drm-free-music-downloa 
ds. 
 404 See, e.g., Amazon; see http://www.amazon.com. 
 405 See, e.g., iTunes; see http://www.itunes.com. 
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licensing agreement,406 are still likely to be guaranteed by the implementation of 
TPMs.  Empirical data on this issue are missing, but further research on these 
new DRM-free business models could shed some light on many issues.  First, it 
could determine to what extent the possibility of enforcing licensing agreements 
has changed with the introduction of DRM-free products, and what the impact 
of this new trend on owners and users is.  Second, it could clarify whether fine-
tuning rather than eliminating DRM systems could meet the needs of users of 
copyright works, as has been suggested by some theoretical research.407 
B.  REMEDIES FOR USERS AGAINST ―UNFAIR‖ DRM 
Remedies available for beneficiaries of copyright exceptions in cases of 
DRM impeding permitted acts are different, both between the U.S. and the EU 
and within the EU.  The reason for this latter difference is that the EU 
legislation on this matter did not take a clear position, and left ample leeway to 
Member States.  
The InfoSoc Directive, in fact, in Article 6(4), enjoins rights holders to take 
―voluntary measures‖ in order to comply with a selected number of copyright 
exceptions.  Failure to do so, according to the Directive, should lead Member 
States to take ―appropriate measures‖ to make sure that rights holders comply 
with the listed copyright exceptions.  Further clarification of both ―appropriate 
measures‖ and ―voluntary measures‖ is provided by Recital 51 of the InfoSoc 
Directive.  On ―voluntary measures‖ the Recital offers the example of 
agreements between rights holders and other parties concerned,408 clearly 
showing its preference for self-regulation.  If self-regulation fails, Member 
States have to take ―appropriate measures,‖ which are also specified in Recital 
51, and which can involve ―modifying an implemented technological measure‖ 
or ―other means.‖409 
Such loose wording induced Member States to take different positions on 
this matter.  A synoptic table below provides the solutions adopted by all 
countries studied in this literature review. 
 
 
Exceptions protected against DRM 
per country 
 
 
System ensuring that DRMs 
comply with copyright 
exceptions 
 
 
Remedies for overreaching 
DRM 
                                                                                                                   
 406 In fact, a survey showed that these DRM-free products are licensed under the usual 
restrictive terms.  See IViR, supra note 66, at 139. 
 407 See Favale, supra note 179. 
 408 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, Recital 51, ¶ 2. 
 409 Id. at Recital 51, ¶ 3. 
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Belgium 
– Reprography 
– Teaching 
– Libraries, etc. 
– Radio broadcasting 
– Handicapped people 
  
Art. 79bis, § 2 of the Copyright 
Act obliges right holders to 
take adequate voluntary 
measures, in a reasonable time-
frame, to allow users to benefit 
from certain copyright 
exceptions:  
Art. 79 bis, § 4 , moreover, 
stipulates that technical 
protection measures cannot 
prevent a lawful user from  
utilising the work in 
conformity with its destination. 
 
 
Art. 87bis of the Copyright 
Act provides that a legal 
action before the president of 
the court of first instance or 
of the commercial court  can 
be undertaken both by the 
interested person or by  
recognised  associations.  
 
Ireland 
 
All Exceptions 
 
SI No. 16/2004 5 (2) ―Where 
the beneficiary is legally 
entitled to access the protected 
work or subject-matter 
concerned, the rights holder 
shall make available to the 
beneficiary the means of 
benefiting from the permitted 
act 
 
SI No. 16/2004 5 (3) ―In the 
event of a dispute arising, the 
beneficiary may apply to the 
High Court for an order 
requiring a person to do or to 
refrain from doing anything 
the doing or refraining from 
doing of which is necessary 
to ensure compliance by that 
person with the provisions of 
this section‖ 
 
 
Portugal 
 
Almost all those with relevance for 
the digital environment410 
 
Art. 221 of Code of Author‘s 
Rights stipulates that the 
owner shall make a legal 
deposit of ―the means to 
access the work‖ that 
beneficiaries of copyright 
exceptions can ask to access  
 
 
Conflicts are solved by the 
Mediation and Arbitrage 
Board established by the law 
n. 83 of the 3rd of Aug. 2001 
 
United Kingdom 
– Private copying for time-shifting 
– Libraries, etc. 
– Ephemeral broadcasting 
– Teaching/Research 
– News reporting 
– Quotation/Criticism 
– Public security/Administration 
 
(Inferred from § 296ZE CDPA) 
Owners have to take voluntary 
measures to allow beneficiaries 
access to copyright works 
 
§ 296ZE Copyright Act  
Users can send a Notice of 
Complaint to the Secretary of 
State 
                                                                                                                   
 410 Private photocopying (not music scores); use in public libraries, museums etc.; partial 
reproduction for teaching; use by disabled people; use for the purposes of public security and 
administrative/judicial proceedings; broadcasting by social institutions; architecture or sculpture 
in public places; incidental inclusion; demonstration or repair of equipment; buildings or their 
drawings or plans; private use; scientific or academic purposes; temporary fixation by 
broadcasting organizations; use for archival purpose; private copying, with respect of the three 
step test, and the copies  not communicated to the public nor commercialised; fixation of 
broadcasts for archival purposes in certain cases. 
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United States 
– Libraries, archives, etc. 
– Public security, administrative/ 
judicial purposes 
– Reverse engineering (software) 
– Research in cryptography 
– Security testing (software) 
– Minors protection 
– Privacy 
 
 
17 U.S.C. 1201(f)(1) (2000).  
Circumvention of TPMs is 
permitted only for 
decompilation to reach inter-
operability of software, where 
this is allowed under copyright 
law 
 
Every three years, the 
Copyright Office rules to 
determine whether certain 
classes of copyrighted works 
should be exempted from the 
USC. § 1201 prohibition 
against circumventing TPMs.  
Users can appeal to the office 
to suggest the addition of 
new instances of fair use to 
the list of the above 
exemptions.411  
 
 
The above shows that the remedies available to beneficiaries of copyright 
exceptions are very different from country to country.  Some of them have also 
been criticised by the literature for their lack of efficiency or for the excessive 
burden they place on the user.412  The discussion on the effectiveness of the 
remedies against an ―unfair DRM‖ is outside of the scope of the present study; 
however, what is relevant to our discourse is that none of these measures seem 
to be directed towards contractual abuses from rights holders. 
C. INTERPLAY BETWEEN DRM AND CONTRACT 
Copyright mass licensing is a by-product of the Internet revolution.  
Copyright owners license their works not only to institutions and businesses, 
but also to end users.  However, in the case of copyright infringement, an end 
user is extremely difficult to sue.  A solution to this problem has been provided 
by technology: the digital product itself bears features that enforce the rights of 
the owner.  These are the TPMs, which impede every access and use not 
authorized by the rights holder. Normally, authorized acts are stipulated by the 
licensing agreement; the contract sets the rules, and the TPMs force users to 
respect them.413 
DRM is a composite system formed by licensing agreements and TPMs, 
which has the objective of setting usage restrictions on digital copyright works.  
These usage restrictions should normally be limited by the boundaries of 
copyright protection. In other words, copyright owners should implement 
                                                                                                                   
 411 See, e.g., Harvard Team Advocates for DRM Exemption at Copyright Office DMCA Hearing, 
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, May 7, 2009, http:// 
cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/5349. 
 412 Ian Brown, Implementing the European Copyright Directive, FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION 
POLICY RESEARCH, http://www.fipr.org/copyright/guide/eucd-guide.pdf. 
 413 See DeWerra, supra note 187, at 250. (Without the TPMs, users would not respect the terms 
and conditions set by contracts.)  
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TPMs only to the extent that they enforce their exclusive rights provided by 
copyright law.  Contracts (the licences) and technical locks (the TPMs) work in 
synergy to guarantee the enforcement of exclusive rights in the digital 
environment, where traditional enforcement tools, like a lawsuit, are not 
effective. 
Moreover, among the rules set by the contract, there is often a clause that 
protects TPMs.  The clause might state, for example, that it is forbidden to 
circumvent, to hinder, or to remove the technological lock.  Circumvention of 
TPMs, therefore, is not only sanctioned by law, both in the US and the EU,414 
but also, sometimes, by contract.  This creates a circular protection between 
contracts and TPMs.415  
* * * 
In conclusion, the strict inter-relation between contract and TPMs may 
suggest that contracts are akin to TPMs.  Both are part of the product,416 and 
both set usage rules that, in the views of many, go beyond the exclusive rights 
of the owner.  Furthermore, some point out that licensing agreements and 
DRM licences are often formulated in a similar fashion.417  However, the 
literature overview in the previous subsection suggests that the only relevant 
similarity between licences and TPMs consists of the ability to set norms of 
private ordering that might run afoul of copyright doctrine.  Surely, TPMs and 
contracts are indissolubly intertwined.  They work together and, according to 
the prevailing literature, they should be designed to comply with copyright 
law—that is, to protect only the exclusive rights of the owner within its 
boundaries. 
                                                                                                                   
 414 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); InfoSoc Directive, supra note 19, art. 6; CDPA 1988, supra note 
96, § 296ZA. 
 415 See IViR, supra note 66, at 153-149. 
 416 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (stating that ―Terms of use are no less a 
part of ‗the product‘ than are the size of the database and the speed with which the software 
compiles listings‖); see also David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen‘s 
―Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-help,‖ 13 BERKELY TECH L.J. 1151, 1159 (1998) (arguing that 
TPMs are a feature of the product, as part of its design.  However, he specifies that TPMs are not 
the contract.). 
 417 Bechtold, supra note 71, at 339 (reporting, in a study on a few music services, that the terms 
of use of DRM licences show a similar pattern as the usage rules of the service), cited in Derclaye, 
supra note 6, at 175. 
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VII.  EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF USER CONTRACTS AND 
DRM 
A.  PROPORTION OF COPYRIGHT MATERIAL DIFFUSED ELECTRONICALLY 
The first data of interest to this literature review are provided by the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and by the EU 
Commission, both in 2009.  They are relevant to the diffusion of electronic 
licences and the products on which they are implemented.  The IFPI reports 
that the market share of digital products is growing every year. Figures relative 
to 2008 reported a share of 35% for games, 20% for recorded music, 4% for 
newspapers, 4% for films, and 1% for magazines.418  The 2009 EU Commission 
Report on e-commerce, discusses the penetration of e-commerce in the EU 
Internal Market.  The data interesting to our discourse is that, on average, (in 
the twenty-seven EU Member States) 30% to 40% of copyright goods are sold 
online.  More ―mature‖ markets like the U.K., France, and Germany reach 
70%.419  All material commercialised online potentially implements electronic 
contracts or end-user licence agreements. However, specific data on the type of 
contracts (e.g., shrink-wrap, click-wrap, or browse-wrap) or the media on which 
they are diffused (e.g., web pages or booklets) are missing. 
1.  Contracts.  The most comprehensive theoretical study on copyright and 
contracts in Europe has been performed by Lucie Guibault of the IViR centre 
in Amsterdam.  Her analysis focuses on the U.S., France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands.  In essence, Guibault concludes that the limits on freedom of 
contract, including consumer protection law, competition law, constitutional 
principles, and copyright law, appear insufficient to ensure that the legitimate 
interests of users of copyright works are respected by copyright licensing 
agreements.420 
Since 2002, when Guibault published her comprehensive study, new 
literature, case law, and legislation has been produced, impacting the 
relationship between contract and copyright law.  None of this, though, seems 
to bring substantial changes to the general scenario outlined by Guibault.  
However, her conclusions regarding potential overridability of copyright limits 
by contract are still waiting to be confirmed by systematic empirical studies.  
The theoretical debate about the tension between copyright exceptions and 
contract continues to engross the copyright doctrine.  Some authors believe, as 
Guibault does, that copyright law should offer enhanced shelter to beneficiaries 
of copyright exceptions against contracts.  Some others, conversely, believe that 
                                                                                                                   
 418 See Kennedy, supra note 209. 
 419 Report on Cross-border E-commerce in the EU, supra note 209. 
 420 Guibault, supra note 56, at 302–04. 
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the balance between copyright and contract does not need to be touched.  For 
others, contracts are even more efficient than copyright in protecting the 
exclusive rights of the owner in the digital environment.   
No comprehensive supra-national survey seems to have been performed on 
the interplay between contracts and copyright exceptions.421   At the national 
level, outside our area of reference, the most interesting and in-depth theoretical 
and empirical study has been carried out by the Australian Copyright Law 
Review Committee.422  
The theoretical part of the study provides a literature and statute review 
including Australia, the U.S. and the EU.  They also examined potential limits to 
contract stemming from—or out of—contract law, as Guibault did.  Similar 
conclusions were reached: remedies outside copyright law are scarcely 
effective.423 
The data utilised in the empirical part of the study are focused on Australian 
sources, and were gathered from a public consultation process and an open 
forum which involved several rights holders, users‘ associations, libraries, and 
academic institutions.424  An Issues Paper was distributed among the 
stakeholders illustrating the terms of reference and posing a number of 
questions instrumental to determine the interplay between copyright limits and 
contracts.425  While the representatives of the rights holders generally reported 
that they did not detect any use of licences overriding copyright limits, a few 
libraries and universities produced examples of contracts hindering copyright 
exceptions.426 
The Australian study concludes that [l]ibrary and user interests 
generally identified a problem regarding the use of online licences 
to modify the exceptions and wanted legislative or other 
intervention.  Owner interests variously asserted that contract law 
and the market can and should regulate the situation or that 
                                                                                                                   
 421 See OECD, supra note 356, at 34 (confirming that empirical studies and measurement of the 
practices in the distribution of digital content, through systematic collection and analysis of data 
are missing). 
 422 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-GENERAL‘S DEPARTMENT COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVIEW COMMITTEE, COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT (2001), http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd. 
nsf/Page/Copyright_CopyrightLawReviewCommittee_CLRCReports_CopyrightandContract_C
opyrightandContract. (Austl.) [hereinafter CLRC]. 
 423 Copyright and Contract Report, CLRC at Chapter 1, 2.09. 
 424 COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT-Submissions, CLRC, supra note 423. 
 425 See COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT Issues Paper, CLRC, supra note 423. 
 426 See, e.g., CLRC Report, supra note 422, Chapter 4, Part II.  
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although the situation is uncertain, it is too early to take 
corrective action.427 
The Australian report also highlighted the fact that licensing agreements 
subject to the analysis are more and more likely to be governed by foreign law; 
therefore, national solutions could be of limited relevance.428 
An empirical study on digital media and consumer issues, in relation to 
electronic licences has been performed in Germany by the local branch of the 
BEUC (the European Consumer Organization).429  The study detected legal 
uncertainties in Germany regarding the application of the exhaustion principle 
(related to physical copies of digital works, CDs, DVDs, etc.) and cross-border 
licensing.  The legal wording of the licences was also found difficult and 
detrimental for consumers.  Another interesting finding for our analysis is that 
legal entitlements of copyright users, such as the possibility to make a back-up 
copy of a computer program, were also often impaired.430 
Case studies have also been performed in the U.S. and Norway on iTunes, 
the largest online retail music seller, and some other similar services.  They all 
revealed that the terms and conditions of the service could run afoul of 
copyright limits—such as the fair use doctrine—beyond negatively affecting 
consumer statutory rights.431 
In the U.K., the British Library carried on an examination of one hundred 
licensing agreements that were offered to them.432  They questioned whether 
the licences at hand allowed the following operations (or accommodated the 
following needs, or even only mentioned them): archiving; printing; 
downloading and electronic copying; fair dealing; visually impaired; inter-library 
loans; exceptions.  The British Library found that 90% of these licences did not 
respect these copyright exceptions and limitations.433  They elaborate, therefore, 
                                                                                                                   
 427 COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT Discussion Paper, CLRC, supra note 423. 
 428 Id.; see also DeWerra, supra note 187 (arguing for a supranational solution). 
 429 See http://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/. 
 430 Consumer Protection in Digital Media: Summary of the Study, http://www.vzbv.de/ 
mediapics/consumer_protection_in_digital_media_2006.pdf.  The study is available (in German) 
at http://www.vzbv.de/go/dokumente/545/5/24/index.html. 
 431 See Gasser, supra note 172; Grondal, supra note 249; Bechtold, supra note 71. 
 432 See ANALYSIS OF 100 CONTRACTS OFFERED TO THE BRITISH LIBRARY, supra note 260 
(explaining methodological approach: ―The study of 100 contracts comprises a randomly selected 
collection of agreements offered to the British Library.  Given the complexities of licensing and 
copyright exceptions, being able to map accurately provisions in a licence over to the intent 
provided for by exceptions law is a complex procedure and one open to debate.  The study was 
carried out in good faith and is intended to be no more than broadly representative.‖).  
 433 See id. 
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a position on copyright exceptions, which includes a number of principles that, 
according to the British Library, should inform U.K. copyright policy.434 
Also, the National Consumer Council carried on a survey on End User 
Licence Agreements on computer software,435 and found that most of the 
licences examined infringe consumer protection legislation.  Unfortunately, the 
study did not address copyright issues, but it suggested that the Office of Fair 
Trading undertake a systematic survey on the practice of electronic licensing to 
detect potential incongruence with the current legislation. 
2.  DRM.  On the issue of DRM, empirical studies seeking to identify the 
impact of DRM on beneficiaries of copyright exceptions have been carried out 
by Intrallect Ltd.436 and by CIPIL.437  Intrallect adapted the ―use cases‖ 
approach, which is a method born in the field of software engineering, to the 
relation between DRM and education and research communities in the U.K.438  
Their study examines a broad number of practical situations affecting 
researchers, teachers, students, and libraries while interacting with DRM.  Their 
purpose is to suggest to the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC)439 the 
best approach and practice to adopt in relation with DRM.  
Their method consisted of organising a number of workshops, six in total, 
to which they invited a relevant number of representatives of stakeholders, in 
total forty-seven participants.440  The workshop participants, after an 
introduction to DRM, were invited to work on their own to produce two case 
summaries each (―short descriptions of a primary actor and her goals, usually no 
more than one or two sentences‖).  The workshop produced 125 case 
                                                                                                                   
 434 See id. 
 435 See Belgrove, supra note 212.  The study involved standard questionnaires to users of 
computer software. 
 436 INTRALLECT, LTD. ON BEHALF OF JOINT INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMITTEE [JISC], 
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT (2004), available at http://www.intrallect.com/in 
dex.php/intrallect/knowledge_base/general_articles (follow ―JISC DRM Study – 2004‖ 
hyperlink). 
 437 See Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law of Cambridge University, U.K., 
http://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk. 
 438 See JISC, supra note 436, at 23 (―The methodology is based on identifying the key 
participants (sometimes called ‗actors‘) and their goals.  For each primary actor and goal, one use 
scenario (or ‗use case‘) is developed in detail and is examined to consider all possible alternatives 
to that scenario.  A set of use cases is complete when use cases have been developed for the goals 
of all the primary participants.  These use cases are described in terms of the user‘s actions and 
make no assumptions about underlying technology.  The use cases are then used to define the 
requirements for a system that will support these scenarios.‖  In short, as the authors of the 
report state, ―[t]he use cases are simply a way of defining what people want to achieve.‖). 
 439 The Joint Information Systems Committee, http://www.jisc.ac.uk. 
 440 See JISC, supra note 436, at 23. 
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summaries in total.  Afterwards, the participants were invited to work in pairs to 
expand on one of their case summaries to develop a use case.441 
As a key finding, they identify the needs of the mentioned categories 
(researchers, teachers, students, and libraries) and suggest an alternative right 
expression language (REL)442 compatible with these needs.  They show, 
therefore that, TPMs are neither good nor bad.  They should be fine-tuned in 
order to accommodate users‘ needs. 
Patricia Akester from CIPIL carried out another survey on the impact of 
DRM on selected beneficiaries of copyright exceptions. Nine standardized 
questionnaires were submitted to representatives of the following copyright 
players: (1) libraries, (2) the visually impaired and partially sighted, (3) private 
users, (4) lecturers, (5) students/researchers, (6) DRM developers, (7) content 
owners, (8) the European Commission, and (9) the U.K. Intellectual Property 
Office.443  The questionnaires were partly open (allowing a free answer from the 
interviewee) and partly closed (with multiple-choice answers).444 
She concluded that some beneficiaries of copyright exceptions are being 
adversely affected by the use of DRM.  She therefore suggested a number of 
legal solutions, involving the modification of article 6(4) of the InfoSoc 
Directive and the involvement of third parties that would guarantee to 
beneficiaries of copyright exceptions lawful access to copyright works.445  
Similar solutions have already been proposed by some in the literature.446  
However, it has been submitted that solutions in a complex field such as DRM, 
in order to be effective, should involve both technological and legal solutions at 
the same time, coordinated between them.447 
The OECD issued a Background Report on Empowering E-consumers in 
December 2009, to serve in the conference on the same topic.448  The 
                                                                                                                   
 441 Id. at 24. 
 442 Rights Expression Language or REL is a machine-processable language used for Digital 
Rights Management.  For an overview of REL, see http://www.loc.gov/standards/rel report.pdf. 
 443 Akester, Technological, supra note 75, at 31. 
 444 Id. at 31. (The reason for this choice was the hope ―to combine the need for rigour with the 
need to understand how respondents themselves describe the issue, in their own language.‖) 
 445 Id. at 2. (Proposes to modify Article 6(4) by clarifying the expression ―appropriate measures‖ 
that Member States have to take in order to have TPMs comply with copyright exceptions, in the 
sense of creating standardized ―access to works portals.‖  These would function through a DRM 
deposit system ―according to which the means to enable beneficiaries of privileged exceptions to 
benefit from them would be deposited and made available through access to works portals, in 
specified circumstances.‖) 
 446 John S. Erickson, Fair Use, DRM, and Trusted Computing, 46(4) COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
ACM 34; Burk, supra note 391.  
 447 Marcella Favale, Access to Copyright Works: Fine-tuning DRM to Balance the Rights of Owners and 
Users, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM Ph.D. dissertation (2007).  
 448 See DSTI/CP(2009)20/FINAL, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/13/440475 
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conference and the report, together with other OECD publications, will be 
instrumental to the second edition of the OECD Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, to be released in 2010.  The 
protection of consumers of digital products from restrictive Terms of Use or 
DRM are raised.  The duty of disclosure of the right owner, the dangers for 
consumer privacy, and other consumer-related issues are discussed, but there is 
no specific focus on the issue of contracts overriding copyright exceptions.  
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the legislation, the case law, and the literature of the targeted 
countries so far reveals a substantial body of literature and case law on the 
interplay between copyright and contract in the United States.  The European 
Union follows, with substantial legislation and literature, but not much relevant 
case law.  Among the individual Member States examined, the U.K. and 
Belgium provided the richest doctrinal contribution to the present study, while 
hardly any case law or literature was found in relation to Ireland and Portugal.  
On the basis of the above data, potential research gaps have been identified.  
These gaps can be seen as new research questions that may provide the basis of 
subsequent research in support of copyright policy development.  It also details 
the approaches and methodologies that could be used in answering such 
questions. 
SECTION 1  
Except for a few notable exceptions,449 hardly any literature and case law has 
discussed the impact that imperative copyright exceptions had on contracting 
licences, in those countries that stipulate mandatory exceptions.  Moreover, the 
difference between countries implementing imperative exceptions and countries 
where freedom of contract prevails has not been the subject of a comparative 
empirical study. 
SECTION 2 
Against overreaching licence agreements the examined literature proposed 
self-regulatory solutions, to be enacted through model licences and codes of 
conduct.450  A study on the feasibility of such solutions could be interesting for 
policy makers. 
                                                                                                                   
83.pdf; Conference documents are available at http://www.oecd.org/icr/econsumerconference. 
 449 Dusollier, supra note 10; Dubuisson, supra note 124. 
 450 See Green paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, supra note 267; the Australian 
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SECTION 3 
The sector of the commercialization of digital copyright works seems to be 
most in need of empirical evidence. First of all, no comprehensive research has 
been done to determine the exact proportion of works commercialised online 
to further determine the pervasiveness of the problem of the overridability of 
both copyright limits by contracts and TPMs/DRMs.451  In addition, specific 
data on the type of contracts (e.g., shrink-wrap; click-wrap or browse-wrap) or 
the media on which they are diffused (e.g., web pages or booklets) are missing.  
No systematic cross-border study has been carried out specifically on the 
compliance of licensing agreements with copyright exceptions.  The lawfulness 
of end-user licence agreements vis-à-vis consumer statutory rights has been 
taken into consideration in a few countries, as we mentioned above in this 
conclusion.  But they hardly refer to any copyright issue, except indirectly.  In 
this sector, sweeping techniques452 could be usefully implemented to 
systematically gather data online, while social quantitative research methods 
would be necessary to examine shrink-wrap licences on material carriers (CDs, 
etc.). 
An interesting research gap has been identified in the licence purchasing 
practices of public libraries and educational institutions.  Their needs in terms 
of copyright allowances, as well as their ability to negotiate clauses allowing 
them, need to be explored. 
SECTION 4 
At present, studies on the limits of contract and copyright, such as those 
carried out by Guibault, appear sufficiently exhaustive.  Subsequent research 
should address practical solutions to accommodate the needs of copyright 
owners and users.  This may include, for example, concrete proposals for 
normative action, or, alternatively, for the adoption of model licences or codes 
of conduct.  
Incidentally, the exclusion of digital copyright works from a number of 
users‘ privileges, as in Article 6(4) of the InfoSoc Directive, is underpinned by 
their status as services rather than goods.  Both their status and their exclusion 
from copyright exceptions (despite the fact that they are copyright works under 
every respect) could be usefully addressed by theoretical research. 
                                                                                                                   
CLRC Study, supra note 264; Garnett 2006, Hugenholtz, supra note 187. 
 451 See IFPI, supra note 209; EU Commission Report, supra note 209. 
 452  These involve exploring the Internet in search of relevant material.  This method is 
particularly interesting also for its relatively contained costs. 
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SECTION 5 
Many theoretical and technological solutions have been proposed in the 
field of DRMs.  The CIPIL study revealed that technical solutions for TPMs 
compliant with copyright exceptions are already available.453  Nonetheless, the 
enjoyment of copyright exceptions is sometimes hindered by DRM.  It is 
therefore a matter for policy makers to implement the correct solutions.  
However, recent business models emerging in the copyright industry should 
be included in the picture.  The impact on users of copyright works of emerging 
DRM-free business models (in terms of acceptability) and their impact on right 
holders (in terms of benefits) should be assessed and analysed both theoretically 
(by economists) and verified empirically. 
                                                                                                                   
 453  Akester, supra note 75, at 70. 
